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A Theory of Punitive Damages
Benjamin C. Zipursky*
A contemporary theory ofpunitive damages must answer two questions: (1)
What place, if any, do punitive damages have in the civil law of tort, given that
they appear to involve an idea of criminal punishment? (2) Why are punitive
damages subject to special constitutional scrutiny, as in the Supreme Court's
decision in BMW v. Gore, if they really are part of the civil law of tort? The
article offers a theory that can answer both of these questions. Punitive
damages have a double aspect, corresponding to two senses of "'punitive. "
Insofar as they pertain to the state's goal of imposing a punishment upon a
defendant who merits deterrence or retribution, they have a criminal aspect.
Insofar as they pertain to the plaintifs "right to be punitive," they have a civil
aspect. Drawing upon the theory of civil recourse that the author has developed
as a challenger to corrective justice theory, the article explains what a "right to
be punitive" means. It then uses the recourse theory of punitive damages to
support a rational reconstruction of the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence ofpunitive damages. When a case can be understood as involving
principally a plaintif's right to be punitive, heightened constitutional scrutiny is
not appropriate. However, where, as in BMW v. Gore, the state is essentially
imposing punishment, the excessiveness of a damages award is properly
scrutinized under heightened constitutional standards.
I. Introduction
A. The Need for a Theory of Punitive Damages
What does the word "punitive" mean in the phrase "punitive damages"?
The standard answer is that punitive damages are intended to punish a defen-
dant who has engaged in a form of tortious conduct that is particularly
egregious. Courts routinely state that the "punishment" delivered by punitive
damages is justified by both deterrent and retributive concerns.1 Indeed, in
an area of law that sometimes seems cluttered with statistics and statutory
* Professor of Law, Fordham University. I am grateful to Fordham University for its Research
Fellowship support; to Alison Lucas, Michael Samalin, and John Rue for research assistance; to
Anita Bernstein, Curtis Bridgeman, Jules Coleman, Matthew Diller, Jill Fisch, Mark Geistfeld, John
Goldberg, Abner Greene, Thomas Lee, Eduardo Penalver, Dan Richman, Catherine Sharkey,
Kenneth Simons, Alex Stein, and Norman Williams for helpful comments on this project, and to
participants in workshops at Cornell Law School, Florida State University, Fordham University,
NYU (NYC Tort Theory Workshop), and UCLA (UCLA Legal Theory Workshop). My casebook
co-authors, John Goldberg and Anthony Sebok, have been ongoing interlocutors about punitive
damages for the past several years and have contributed greatly to my thinking about this subject.
1. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (stating that
unlike compensatory damages, which are aimed to redress concrete loss due to wrongful injury,
"punitive damages.., are aimed at deterrence and retribution").
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developments, the mantra of "deterrence and retribution" as applied to
punitive damages has the comforting ring of familiarity.
Yet it is precisely this focus on punishment that leads to the greatest
perplexities in punitive damages law. This is for two interrelated reasons,
one sounding in constitutional law, the other in tort. Within constitutional
law, what is most puzzling is that courts are as unintrusive as they are with
regard to punitive damages. State courts are open about their reasons for im-
posing punitive damage awards. Litigants on both sides, as well as the
constitutional courts receiving challenges to these cases, go right ahead and
concede the punitive nature of the remedy sought. Most jurisdictions' state-
of-mind standard for punitive damages approaches something like criminal
2scienter. Many states hold punitive damages to be uninsurable as a matter of
public policy, just as criminal fines are.3 And some even demand a higher
evidentiary standard-"clear and convincing evidence"-in light of the
"quasi-criminal" nature of punitive damages.4 Yet until the 1990s, punitive
damages triggered virtually no constitutional protection whatsoever, and
even now such protection remains quite minimal-certainly a far cry from
that afforded even the most minimal criminal sanction. The reason for the
near-immunity from scrutiny for punitive damages awards has been, of
course, that punitive damages are nominally civil and nominally part of pri-
vate tort cases. But in a legal system that regularly cautions against elevating
form over substance, it is peculiar that there has been near-immunity for what
are openly labeled forms of "punishment."
The constitutional puzzle leads us back to a more basic question in torts:
Why are punitive damages part of tort law at all? Isn't tort law about
compensation, making victims whole, or corrective justice? Even from an
economic point of view, isn't it about deterrence by cost-internalization, or
about insurance? Why is this criminal-seeming treatment found within our
private law, our tort system?
This article offers a theory of punitive damages to answer these difficult
questions in both tort and constitutional law. The theory takes root at the
question with which the article opened: What does the word "punitive" mean
in the phrase "punitive damages"? The answer is that the word "punitive"
has two connotations. One meaning-as already indicated-is that punitive
damages are intended to punish a defendant who has acted egregiously. But
a more fundamental meaning within tort law is that punitive damages are
permitted in light of our legal system's recognition that the plaintiff has a
right to be punitive. Drawing from the model of rights, wrongs, and
2. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381, 1064 (2000) ("Some courts insist upon
malice, ill-will, and intent to injure, evil motive or the like, while others have found it sufficient that
the defendant engages in wanton misconduct with its conscious indifference to risk.").
3. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003) (citing Ind. Code § 34-51-3-2
(1998)) (asserting wide legislative discretion in modifying "quasi-criminal sanctions" such as
punitive damages).
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recourse-a tort theory I have developed in several prior articles 5-I shall
argue that it is the plaintiffs right to be punitive, not the system's need to
punish the defendant, that explains the special status of punitive damages
within American tort law.
The plaintiffs right to be punitive constitutes the core of a civil aspect
of punitive damages, while the state's goal of inflicting punishment upon the
defendant is the root of a criminal aspect. Punitive damages are a tricky
subject because they have this double aspect, both civil and criminal. They
belong firmly within tort law insofar as they involve, at root, the plaintiffs
right to be punitive. But in the past century, particularly in recent decades,
the criminal aspect of punitive damages has taken an increasingly large role
within what is still nominally the civil law of torts. In other words, punitive
damages law within state tort law today is not entirely about the plaintiff's
right to be punitive; it is also about the need to punish a defendant whose
conduct requires deterrence and retribution, according to the state.
This "double aspect" of punitive damages law explains both its
enduringly controversial nature within tort law and its increasingly tentative
constitutional status. Insofar as punitive damages are basically civil, and not
about criminal punishment, they do not merit the special constitutional
scrutiny afforded to criminal defendants. Insofar as they are criminal, they
do merit such scrutiny. The Supreme Court's peculiar progression in its
punitive damages case law reflects a tension between these two images.
Ultimately, I shall argue that its leading punitive damages decision, BMW v.
Gore,6 can be fruitfully reconstructed once we understand the two senses of
"punitive" in "punitive damages." And more generally, a variety of ques-
tions within tort law and policy about the need for, or wisdom of, punitive
damages reform will come into focus once we see more clearly what punitive
damages are about.
5. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEo. L.J. 695 (2003)
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse] (arguing that by its own standards, the corrective justice
theory is inferior to the civil recourse theory as an explanation of tort law); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 623 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter Zipursky, Private Law]
(constructing a social contract theory basis for the theory of civil recourse in private law and
displaying the Lockean and Blackstonian ideas upon which it is founded); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Rights] (introducing the model of "rights, wrongs, and recourse" as a general theory of
tort law and arguing that it is interpretively superior to leading accounts of law and economics and
corrective justice theory). See also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2005)
(arguing that the concept of civil recourse has a fundamental place in our constitutional structure
and derives from the liberal political theory of Blackstone, Locke, and their predecessors).
Professor Goldberg and I have applied civil recourse theory jointly in several works. See, e.g., John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002) (explaining
injury and causation requirements of negligence law in terms of civil recourse theory).
6. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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B. Methodological Preliminaries
Two methodological preliminaries are in order. First, the theory offered
here is interpretive in a sense that, even if difficult to pin down, is
nevertheless quite usual and well understood. It is not simply historical or
doctrinal, and it is not exactly a matter of moral or political philosophy,
either.7 I am not aiming to provide a history of punitive damages as they
have been, or to argue from a first-order normative point of view about what
punitive damages should be or whether we ought to have them. I am arguing
that punitive damages in tort law today represent a certain constellation of
ideas, principles, and concepts. The goal is to explain how these ideas might
fit together and be embodied in our legal system in a manner that is roughly
coherent and largely harmonizes with the history, structure, and language of
the area, while nevertheless permitting some critical distance. I have
elsewhere called this approach "pragmatic conceptualism," and written
extensively to explain and defend it.8 Here, I simply aim to use it.
Second, while the article has a rather broad goal-a theory of punitive
damages-it also has a narrower goal: the interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decisions on punitive damages, and in particular, of its decision in
the singularly important case BMW v. Gore. The pursuit of the narrower goal
is, as I have constructed the article, a means of pursuing the broader. In part,
the selection of this rather roundabout route is driven by a general
predilection on my part to utilize "great cases" or "chestnuts" of torts in order
to get a grasp of difficult theoretical questions. 9  But there is a more
particular reason why Gore is so well suited to this enterprise, one which my
introductory discussion presaged. Gore was the case, within American tort
law, that pushed the envelope too far, the case in which the anomaly of what
appeared to be punishment within a simple tort case could no longer be toler-
ated by our highest court. And so, as a practical matter, it is the case that
7. Note that three leading scholars in tort theory-Richard Posner, Jules Coleman, and Ernest
Weinrib-have advocated interpretive methodologies that satisfy this description; they try to
capture the normative ideas underlying the system, without necessarily arguing that the system is
right from a first-order moral point of view. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 2
(1992); ERNEST J. WE1NRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 2 (1995); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 31-32 (1972).
8. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 484-85 (2000)
(explaining how conceptual theory may nevertheless be practice-based, nonmetaphysical, and
practical).
9. See Zipursky, Rights, supra note 5, at 90-93 (utilizing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), to explain the basic structure of tort law); John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1745-52 (1998) (utilizing
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916), to explain the duty element in negligence
law); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 5 (utilizing Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley,
521 U.S. 424 (1997) to explore the emotional harm doctrine); Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214,
231-44 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (utilizing Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980),
to explain the consistency of the causation requirement with marketshare liability).
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finally demands a theory of punitive damages that comes clean on what
punitiveness is really about.
C. Introduction to Gore
In 1992, Dr. Ira Gore bought a $40,000 BMW whose only flaw was
cosmetic and invisible.10 However, because he happened to spend more
money on the BMW to have it detailed, he learned that it had once had some
discoloration from acid rain that had been painted over and rendered invisible
to him." Upset at BMW's failure to disclose this fact to him prior to
purchase, he sued for fraud under Alabama law.' 2 Because of this invisible
flaw, Gore won a jury verdict of $4,000 in compensatory damages and, citing
a pattern of similar behavior by BMW across the country, $4 million in
punitive damages against BMW.' 3 The trial court entered judgment and the
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, reducing the punitive damages award to
$2 million.
14
BMW turned for relief to the United States Supreme Court, arguing not
only that this $2 million award for an invisible flaw was unjust, but that it
violated the United States Constitution. For a 5-4 majority, Stevens
reversed, but did not rely on the Eighth Amendment or on any particular
defect of Alabama civil procedure. 5 Rather, he simply decided that there
were notice difficulties implicating the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause for a verdict that was so excessive relative to plausible
guideposts of reprehensibility, proportionality to (or disparity from) actual or
potential harm suffered, and comparable statutory sanctions. 16 Breyer added
a nuanced concurring opinion, focusing on the arbitrariness of the jury
award. 17 Scalia dissented bitterly with characteristic bravado, offering the
powerful if well-worn complaint that a due process critique is incoherent if it
lacks any criticism of process; the idea that the award turned out to be
excessive is not a due process idea.' 8 The case's complement of academic
curiosities is rounded out by a surprise pairing of Ginsburg and Rehnquist,
who respectfully but forcefully asserted that the Court should restrain itself
and let other branches of government solve the mounting problem of punitive
damages.'9
10. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563.
11. See id. at 563 & n. 1 (indicating that the top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of Dr. Gore's
car were repainted and that the damage was likely the result of acid rain).
12. Id. at 563.
13. Id. at 564-65.
14. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994).
15. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586.
16. Id. at 575.
17. Id. at 586 (Breyer, J,, concurring).
18. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Gore's three-pronged test for gross excessiveness under the Fourteenth
Amendment is now clearly the law. The Court followed up Gore two years
later with Cooper v. Leatherman, where it held that a de novo review of
excessiveness was appropriate for appellate courts. 20 And in June of 2003,
the Court decided by a 6-3 margin to engage in a very aggressive punitive
damages reduction under a due process theory, holding in State Farm v.
Campbell that ordinarily an award more than nine times compensatories will
be excessive as a matter of constitutional law.21
D. Outline of the Article
Part II lays out the progression of the Supreme Court's punitive
damages decisions from its inception through Gore. Part III articulates the
theoretical problem of describing the civil and criminal aspects of punitive
damages and explains why the solution to that problem is likely to help us
understand Gore, and also why it is difficult to address the problem within
contemporary tort theory. Part IV explores several recent articles on punitive
damages that can be understood as addressing the double aspect problem, but
then argues that none succeed. Part V explains the model of rights, wrongs,
and recourse, which I have developed in several prior articles. 22 Part VI is
the heart of the article. It utilizes the model of rights, wrongs, and recourse
to solve the double aspect problem, and then returns to our initial questions:
(1) What place, if any, do punitive damages have in the civil law of tort,
given that they appear to involve an idea of criminal punishment? (2) Why
are punitive damages subject to special constitutional scrutiny, as in the
Supreme Court's decision in BMWv. Gore, if they really are part of the civil
law of tort? Part VII uses this framework to suggest a means of
reconstructing BMW v. Gore in a more defensible light.
II. The Peculiar Path of Punitive Damages at the Supreme Court
A. The Arrival of Constitutional Punitive Damages Law at the Supreme
Court
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.,23 the Supreme Court opened up what has become an important domain
of case law on the constitutionality of punitive damages. Numerous
academics at the time had written articles asserting that large punitive
damages were unconstitutional,24 and yet the Court took a negative approach.
20. 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
21. 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
22. See supra note 5.
23. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of
the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 667 (1988) (arguing that the Excessive Fines
Clause should limit punitive damage awards that are disproportionate to the injury caused); John
[Vol. 84:105
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It rejected the claim that a large punitive damages award violated federal
common law, and more importantly, rejected the assertion that it was a
proper basis for a claim under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause. 25 Noting the long history of punitive damages within both English
and American tort law (including at the time of the ratification of the Eighth
Amendment) and emphasizing the distinction between damages paid to
private plaintiffs versus fines paid to the state, the Court declined to open an
Eighth Amendment avenue for defendants seeking a reduction in punitive
damages:
We think it clear, from both the language of the Excessive Fines
Clause and the nature of our constitutional framework, that the Eighth
Amendment places limits on the steps a government may take against
an individual, whether it be keeping him in prison, imposing excessive
monetary sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishments. The fact
that punitive damages are imposed through the aegis of courts and
serve to advance governmental interests is insufficient to support the
step petitioners ask us to take. While we agree with petitioners that
punitive damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence,
which are also among the interests advanced by the criminal law, we
fail to see how this overlap requires us to apply the Excessive Fines
Clause in a case between private parties. Here, the government of
Vermont has not taken a positive step to punish, as it most obviously
does in the criminal context, nor has it used the civil courts to extract
large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or
disabling some individual."
The Court left open the question of whether the Due Process clause might be
a basis for a constitutional challenge-a question that Justices Brennan and
Marshall, in concurrence, suggested they would likely answer
affirmatively. 2
7
Justice O'Connor--clearly the Court's most fervent voice in favor of
punitive damages scrutiny-concurred that petitioners had no federal com-
mon law argument, and concurred in the view that a due process claim was
not properly presented, but wrote a strong dissenting opinion adopting the
28position of the petitioner and its amici on the Excessive Fines Clause issue.She argued that the Excessive Fines Clause incorporated principles within
Calvin Jeffies, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139
(1986) (suggesting that repetitive punitive awards for a single course of conduct may violate the
Excessive Fines Clause); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages:
Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987) (contending that the Excessive Fines
Clause should apply to punitive damages in civil cases); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983) (arguing that
punitive damages should be subject to limitation by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments).
25. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280.
26. Id. at 275.
27. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20051
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the Magna Carta that closely resembled rejection of large and entirely
discretionary monetary penalties.29  Following the historical account
generated by Gerald Boston, John Jeffries, Jr., and Calvin Massey, Justice
O'Connor pointed out that the concept of a "fine" was a descendant of the
"amercement. 30  Amercements were discretionary monetary sanctions
imposed by the Crown and paid to the Crown or to feudal lords.3 1 These
awards were probably best characterized as lying between the civil and the
criminal, Justice O'Connor remarked,32  although she observed that
Blackstone regarded them as "civil., 33  The thrust of her fairly detailed
argument is that when the Excessive Fines Clause was enacted, it reflected an
adoption of Article Ten of the English Bill of Rights (prohibiting excessive
fines), which in turn incorporated the idea of the Magna Carta's prohibition
of disproportionate amercements.3 4 Notably, Justice Stevens, the author of
the Court's opinion in Gore, was the only Justice signing onto O'Connor's
opinion.35
Despite the 7-2 configuration of Browning-Ferris, the Justices'
apparent openness to the due process claim quickly spurred further
constitutional litigation. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,36 the
Court directly addressed the argument that a large punitive damages award
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In a somewhat
vague opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun reasoned:
So far as we have been able to determine, every state and federal court
that has considered the question has ruled that the common-law
method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due
process. In view of this consistent history, we cannot say that the
common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently
unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional....
This, however, is not the end of the matter. It would be just as
inappropriate to say that, because punitive damages have been
recognized for so long, their imposition is never unconstitutional. We
note once again our concern about punitive damages that "run wild."
29. Id. at 288.
30. Id. at 286-89 (citing Gerald Boston, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment:
Application of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 667 (1988); John Jeffries, Jr., A
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Calvin Massey,
The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1233 (1987)).
31. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
32. Id. at 288.
33. Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 378
(Edward Christian ed., A. Strahan 15th ed. 1809)).
34. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 287-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
35. Id. at 282.
36. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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Having said that, we conclude that our task today is to determine
whether the Due Process Clause renders the punitive damages award
in this case constitutionally unacceptable.
37
Justice Blackmun went on to approve the award, noting that:
[The defendant] thus had the benefit of the full panoply of Alabama's
procedural protections. The jury was adequately instructed. The trial
court conducted a post-verdict hearing that conformed [to Alabama's
decision establishing post-trial procedures for scrutinizing punitive
awards. 38] The trial court specifically found that the conduct in
question "evidenced intentional malicious, gross, or oppressive
frauds" and found the amount of the award to be reasonable in light of
the importance of discouraging insurers from similar conduct. Pacific
Mutual also received the benefit of appropriate review by the Supreme
Court of Alabama.
39
In a concluding passage that presages the Court's approach in
succeeding opinions, especially Gore, Justice Blackmun offered these half-
apologetic remarks:
We are aware that the punitive damages award in this case is more
than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, is more than 200
times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent Haslip, and, of course,
is much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance fraud
under [Alabama statutory law]. Imprisonment, however, could also be
required of an individual in the criminal context. While the monetary
comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be close to the line, the award
here did not lack objective criteria. We conclude, after careful
consideration, that in this case it does not cross the line into the area
of constitutional impropriety. Accordingly, Pacific Mutual's due
process challenge must be, and is, rejected.4 °
What is striking in this passage-and comes back to dominate Justice
Stevens's thinking-is the concept of a "line" of "constitutional impropriety"
that must not be crossed. The line metaphor is perhaps inappropriate, and
certainly ironic, in light of the fact that Browning-Ferris had expressly shut
the door only two years earlier on a constitutional provision that would have
focused the Court's attention on a question of "excessiveness." Haslip is the
case that begins to employ a provision-the Due Process Clause-that has no
apparent relation to a form of thinking that involves judging whether a "line"
has been crossed.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Haslip is famous for its adoption of a
rigid, purely historicist account of the procedures required by the Due
37. Id. at 17-18 (internal citations omitted).
38. Hammond v. City of Gadsen, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Ala. 1986).
39. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 (internal citations omitted).
40. Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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Process Clause.' While he has frequently referred back to the framework
developed in this opinion both in reproductive rights and personal autonomy
cases, making no mystery of his broader negative agenda on substantive due
42process, he has also applied it generally in procedural due process cases.
Moreover, as noted above, while the other Justices protested the exclusivity
of Justice Scalia's reliance on history,43 the majority opinion comfortably
gave presumptive weight to history in its due process analysis. And, indeed,
in a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested that the Court was ill-
situated to second-guess state courts on punitive damages and that, therefore,
the presumptive weight given to the historical pedigree should win the day. 44
In a powerful, unjoined dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor articulated
a straight, two-barreled procedural due process argument for striking down
the punitive damages award in Haslipit First, she exposed the extraordinary
degree of discretion given to juries under Alabama law and applied a void-
for-vagueness argument rooted in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,46 a 1966 due
process decision.47 Giaccio, which struck down a statute permitting a jury to
use its discretion in deciding whether to assess costs against an acquitted
criminal defendant, held that "one of the basic purposes of the Due Process
Clause has always been to protect a person against having the Government
impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the
land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law
must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that
courts must enforce.
' 48
In unusually crisp prose, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the application
of Giaccio (and related decisions) to the punitive damages case before the
Court yielded a straightforward answer:
The vagueness question is not even close. This is not a case where a
State has ostensibly provided a standard to guide the jury's discretion.
Alabama, making no pretensions whatsoever, gives civil juries
41. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 791 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 199 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
43. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17 (noting that it would be inappropriate to refuse a due process
inquiry simply because of the historical recognition of punitive damages); id. at 60 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (approving of the Court's rejection of Scalia's notion of a purely historical due process
analysis).
44. Id. at 40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy not only joined the majority in Gore,
he subsequently authored Campbell, the Court's most aggressive strike at punitive damages. BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003).
45. 499 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
47. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 44-48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 403.
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complete, unfettered, and unchanneled discretion to determine
whether or not to impose punitive damages. Not only that, the State
tells the jury that it has complete discretion. This is a textbook
example of void-for-vagueness doctrine. Alabama's common-law
scheme is unconstitutionally vague because the State entrusts the jury
with "such broad and unlimited power... that the jurors must make
determinations of the crucial issue upon their notions of what the law
should be instead of what it is.
'A9
In a second component of her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that
even putting aside void-for-vagueness, a Mathews v. Eldridge50 analysis
would easily yield the conclusion that Alabama's procedure was
unconstitutional, in light of its failure to provide the jury with substantially
greater guidance in their decision.
A similar lineup of justices produced a similar result in the Court's next
punitive damages decision, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.51 Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, approved a West Virginia
punitive damages award in a fraud case, where the ratio of punitives to
compensatories was 526 to 1.52 When the potential harm of the defendants'
conduct was considered, the punitives were not so unreasonable as to require
overturning. 53 Pivotally, however, Justice Stevens adopted Blackmun's
moderate, if unstable, perspective:
"We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however, that [a]
general concer[n] of reasonableness. . . properly enter[s] into the
constitutional calculus." And, to echo Haslip once again, it is with
this concern for reasonableness in mind that we turn to petitioner's
argument that the punitive award in this case was so "grossly
excessive" as to violate the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause.
54
And Justice Stevens expressly cited several Lochner-era precedents in
defense of the assertion that the Due Process Clause placed limits on
permissible penalties.55 As in Haslip, Justice Scalia concurred (joined by
49. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 403).
50. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
51. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
52. Id. at 453.
53. Id. at 460-61.
54. Id. at 458 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
55. Specifically the Court stated:
TXO correctly points out that several of our opinions have stated that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits "beyond which
penalties may not go." Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907).
See also St. Louis, I.M & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); Standard
Oil Co. of Ind v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912). Moreover, in Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915), the Court actually set
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Justice Thomas),56 as did Justice Kennedy in part. And while Justice
O'Connor again offered a vigorous dissent, she was joined this time by
Justice White and (in part) Justice Souter 8
Taken together, this train of cases, with a mounting tort reform
movement,59 telegraphed the arrival of Gore in 1996.60 Justice Stevens again
wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, O'Connor, and
61Souter. Justices O'Connor and Souter also concurred in Justice Breyer's
separate concurring opinion.62 As discussed in the next section, Justice
Scalia dissented (joined by Justice Thomas),63 and Justice Ginsburg dissented
(joined by Justice Rehnquist).64
Justice Stevens began his constitutional scrutiny by addressing an issue
that was somewhat peripheral, relative to the enduring significance of the
holding of the case: the relevance of out-of-state conduct to punitive
damages.65 Almost as a preliminary, Stevens began by stating that Alabama
aside a penalty imposed on a telephone company on the ground that it was so "plainly
arbitrary and oppressive" as to violate the Due Process Clause. Id, at 491. In an
earlier case the Court had stated that it would not review state action fixing the
penalties for unlawful conduct unless "the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to
amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law." Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909).
TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-54. In a footnote, Justice Stevens stated:
In each of those cases, the Court actually found no constitutional violation. Thus, in
the Seaboard Air Line R. Co. case, the Court concluded: "We know there are limits
beyond which penalties may not go---even in cases where classification is legitimate-
but we are not prepared to hold that the amount of penalty imposed is so great or the
length of time within which the adjustment and payment are to be made is so short that
the act imposing the penalty and fixing the time is beyond the power of the State." 207
U.S. at 78-79.
Id at 454 n. 16.
56. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring)
57. Id. at 465 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 472 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at § 391, 1093-97 (noting the array of criticisms levied against
tort law since the 1980s asserting that the system is "out of control," the injured are
overcompensated, and that as a result insurance costs are inflated; other more specific schools of
criticism were directed at mass tort litigation and the inadequacy of the "deterrence" effect of tort
law).
60. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). I have omitted one intervening case,
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), which involved punitive damages, but not their
permissibility. Several cases prior to Browning-Ferris also involved discussions, in some cases
quite significant, regarding punitive damages in particular areas. See, e.g., United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989) (implying that punitive damages awarded to the government in a civil action
may raise Eighth Amendment concerns); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(severely narrowing the domain of defamation cases in which punitive damages would be
available).
61. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
62. Id. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74. An important fact leading the Court to be deeply suspicious of
the verdict was that Gore's attorney was permitted to argue to the jury that BMW had engaged in
[Vol. 84:105
A Theory of Punitive Damages
would be violating principles of state sovereignty and comity if it used the
potentiality of economic sanctions to change conduct in other states as a
basis for the punitive damages award.66 The comity and federalism aspects
of Gore, along with the fact that BMW is a foreign luxury car maker that was
judged harshly by an Alabama jury, may have been influential in moving the
Justices to take the case and to act aggressively within it. Suspiciousness of
jury overreaching against unpopular foreign entities and suspiciousness of
states overreaching their proper scope of power are ideas that resonate with
the Supreme Court's sense of its own mission within the constitutional
scheme. There is every reason to believe these instincts would have been
anticipated by BMW's sophisticated counsel and the tort reform interests that
supported BMW at the Court. At the same time, the Justices were surely
aware that these were only "hooks" for the proponents of constitutional
scrutiny of punitive damages; the larger issue, by far, was whether the Court
would strike down the award as excessive, and would hold that--even apart
from comity and state sovereignty issues-there are guidelines for
constitutional excessiveness that in principle apply to any punitive damages
award under any American jurisdiction's tort law. The Court so held, and it
is the reasoning leading to that conclusion that is of principal importance.
There is little that is surprising in the central portions of Stevens's
opinion. He apparently felt pressure to tie the striking down of damages
under the Due Process Clause to a familiar procedural concept: "notice."
Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of
the penalty that a State may impose. Three guideposts, each of which
indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude
of the sanction that Alabama might impose for adhering to the
nondisclosure policy67 adopted in 1983, lead us to the conclusion that
the $2 million dollar award against BMW is grossly excessive: the
degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity between
the harm or potential harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive
nearly 1,000 instances of the same conduct around the country, and this argument appears to have
been central to the inflation of a $4,000 compensatory damages award to a $4,000,000 punitive
damages award. Id. at 564-65. BMW argued to the Alabama Supreme Court and to the United
States Supreme Court that, in many other states, it was not only perfectly legal to have this policy
(which BMW maintained was legal throughout the country, including in Alabama), but also sellers
were statutorily authorized to have a policy such as BMW's. Id. at 565. Justice Stevens opined that
this violated state sovereignty and comity principles. Id. at 571-73. As Justice Scalia pointed out in
his dissent, however, the relevance of this finding by Justice Stevens is questionable in light of the
fact that the Alabama Supreme Court had reached the same conclusion and affirmed a $2 million
verdict that supposedly involved only in-state conduct. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 572.
67. Under this national policy, BMW did not disclose minor repairs whose cost was less than
3% of the value of the vehicle. The policy was central to the fraud claim which, Gore asserted,
warranted punitive damages. Id. at 563-64.
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damages award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
68
And yet little or none of the analysis that follows addresses the issue of
notice, at least not in any clear way. Rather, it all seems to pertain to the
three guideposts: reprehensibility, ratio between punitive and non-punitive
damages, and comparable civil penalties. 69 And it pertains to the bearing of
these guideposts upon gross excessiveness, as Justice Stevens's concluding
statement makes very clear: "As in Haslip, we are not prepared to draw a
bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive dam-
ages award. Unlike that case, however, we are fully convinced that the
grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional
limit."70
Justice Stevens applied the three guideposts, and, not surprisingly,
found: the concealment of the damage was not particularly reprehensible; the
harm was minimal compared to the punitives award; and the comparable
civil penalties were only a tiny fraction of the $2 million.71 The Court there-
fore struck down the award, finally holding that punitive damages can be
unconstitutional.72 On remand, the trial judge reduced the punitive damages
to $50,000, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.73
The law of Gore, as indicated in thousands of lower court opinions
today74 and in two subsequent Supreme Court opinions, 75 requires a
determination of whether damages are excessive to the point of being
constitutionally impermissible in light of the three guideposts. Although
Justice Breyer's concurrence, drawing upon some of the themes in
68. Id. at 574-75 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at 575-80 (discussing the degree of reprehensibility of BMW's conduct); see id. at
580-83 (indicating the need for a reasonable relationship between actual harm and punitive
damages); see id. at 583-84 (comparing punitive damages to the civil penalties authorized for
comparable misconduct).
70. Id at 585-86. On remand to the Alabama Supreme Court, the punitive damages awarded
were $50,000. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997).
71. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
72. Id. at 585-86.
73. More precisely, the trial court ordered a new trial unless the damages were remitted to
$50,000. BMW, 701 So. 2d at 515. Notably, Justice Stevens's opinion dropped a footnote
indicating that, in light of fourteen Alabama cases and the juries' manifest attraction to the idea of
multiplying the number of other instances by $4,000, "respect for the error-free portion of the jury
verdict would seem to produce an award of $56,000 ($4,000 multiplied by fourteen, the number of
repainted vehicles sold in Alabama)." Gore, 517 U.S. at 567 n.11.
74. See, e.g., Allison L. Bussell, Comment, The Eclipse of State Common-Law Review and
Assessment of Punitive Damages by the Due Process Analysis: The Aftermath of BMW of North
America v. Gore, Inc., 71 TENN. L. REv. 337 (2004) (analyzing the impact of Gore in subsequent
lower and higher court decisions).
75. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419-30 (2003) (applying
guidepost analysis from Gore to punitive damages awarded in bad-faith action against an insurance
company); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 442-43 (2001)
(holding that appellate courts should apply a de novo standard to constitutional excessiveness
inquiry regarding punitive damages).
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O'Connor's earlier opinions, emphasizes the vagueness of Alabama's
standards and "the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or
property through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of
arbitrary coercion, 76 it is, of course, the Court's opinion, with its focus on
excessiveness and the three guideposts, that has served as the legal standard.
B. The Two-Fold Critique of the Dissenters
The two dissenting opinions in Gore clearly press its shortcomings.
Justice Scalia in effect contends that all of the putative constitutional argu-
ments against the punitive damage awards are either unsound or irrelevant.
First, the comity argument is irrelevant, since the Alabama Supreme Court
accepted it, and took it into account.77 Second, the due process argument is
based on a misconception of what the Due Process Clause means, a view
Justice Scalia had developed extensively in his Haslip concurrence. 78
Parenthetically, the excessive fines argument was rejected in Browning-
Ferris,79 and no argument for resurrecting it was put forward in Gore.
Moreover, the standard procedural due process argument based on the
looseness of the state law standards had been made before Gore, and
rejected.80  More particularly, the test used by the Alabama courts8' was
specifically endorsed in a prior Supreme Court decision in which punitive
damages were expressly evaluated. 2 While Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion in effect revisits that issue,83 his opinion is not the opinion of the
Court. Moreover, Breyer really had nothing to say about what sort of
standards would be adequate procedurally, nothing to say about the contrary
precedent, and nothing to say about the historical argument cutting in the
other direction.
Perhaps most important, according to Scalia, is what Stevens's opinion
for the Court did say: the real problem identified was that the award was
simply too big.84 The "just-too-big" interpretation of Stevens's opinion is
quite compelling in light of the fact that Gore is the culmination of a series of
opinions by members of Stevens's five-member majority on punitive
damages whose main message seems to have been: We are troubled by these
awards because they are very large, and, although we are not yet willing to
say that they are so large that they are unconstitutional, we also do not rule
76. Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 598, 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 598-99 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 25-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
79. 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989)
80. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991).
81. Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989) (setting forth a several-
factor test to be used for reviewing excessiveness of punitive damages awards under common law).
82. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22 (1991) (approving the Green Oil test as part of what renders
Alabama's procedures permissible from a procedural due process standpoint).
83. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586, 589 (Breyer, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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out the possibility that some day an award will come which will be so large,
on the facts, that it crosses the threshold of constitutional acceptability. By
Stevens's own terms, Gore's $2 million for an undetectable flaw is the case
that crosses the line.
The "just-too-big" rationale is indefensible, Scalia argues, because there
is no constitutional hook for it once the procedural due process and excessive
fines arguments have been rejected.85 The Court therefore has no business
even opining on whether the damages award is too large; there is no legal
consequence to that decision given that the excessiveness of damages is a
question of state law. 86 To say that the damages are a violation of the Due
Process Clause based on a defect not in the process but only in the result is
incoherent. Of course, in one sense, it is not unprecedented, for all of the
substantive due process cases that Scalia deplores also find a violation of the
Due Process Clause based on a judgment of the injustice of the substantive
result, rather than on the lack of adequate process.88 This is what Scalia has
in mind when he brands the Court's decision as a new entry in substantive
due process.
89
It is important for the structure of Scalia's constitutional theory and the
nature of his reproach of substantive due process cases that he need not say
any more than this to condemn them. But for many lawyers, this does not
say enough; even before Griswold the Court's due process jurisprudence laid
a foundation in precedent for a realm of due process that is not really about
procedure, and certainly continued after Griswold to do so. 90 And so it
would be easy to discount Scalia's refutation as too facile, too contentiously
opposed to substantive due process, perhaps because of his strong views on
abortion.91
85. Id. at 602.
86. Id. at 600.
87. Id at 607.
88. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(critiquing the Court's improper use of rational basis review and accusing the Court of having
"signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda" by interfering with the legislative process to
achieve a result); State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (rejecting the Gore framework
for punitive damages and reasserting the position that the state process for calculating damages was
appropriate); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's decision was based on "personal predilection" and not "reasoned
judgment").
89. Gore, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEXAS L. REv. 211,
257-58 (1993) (arguing that due process protection of substantive liberties is deeply embedded in
the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence). Fleming's substantive due process discussion
relies on several well-known cases. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Pedigrees of Rights and Powers in Scalia's Cruzan
Concurrence, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 283 (1994) (depicting Scalia's historicist due process
jurisprudence as, in part, strategic).
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I think that this would be a mistake, as indicated by the fact that Justice
Ginsburg also dissented in Gore.92 She is among the Justices whose views
are not history-bound and do not display fear of broad interpretations of
rights-bearing clauses of the Constitution. Gore does not fit the model of
landmark substantive due process cases in any respects except those which
would tend to undermine its plausibility. That is, it fits in the sense that it
appears to be textually untethered, it undermines state law, and it lacks any
discernible connection to genuine questions about the acceptability of the
state procedures actually utilized.93 But cases like Pierce,94 Griswold,95
Roe,96 and Casey9 7 arguably have two attributes that appear to be lacking in
Gore. First, these cases purport to be about substantive fundamental rights.
98
Second (and relatedly), advocates of federal judicial protection of those
rights under the rubric of the Constitution advance arguments that the federal
judiciary is specially situated as an institution to provide protection for those
rights that we have reason to believe-for reasons other than contingent
history-will not be reliably protected through other institutions.99 Corporate
interests in dollars are anything but fundamental rights, and virtually no one
in America believes that state and federal legislatures are systematically ill-
designed to recognize corporate interests. The relative institutional incom-
petence of the federal judiciary is the message that the oddly matched pair of
Ginsburg and Rehnquist drive home in the second dissent.
100
92. Gore, 517 U.S. at 607.
93. Id. at 599-601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's substantive due process
analysis is based on neither constitutional text nor on any solid precedent).
94. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the liberty of parents to direct
the education of their children is protected by the Due Process Clause).
95. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right of married couples to
use contraceptives is protected by the Due Process Clause).
96. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to abortion is protected by the
Due Process Clause).
97. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming Roe).
98. See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (recognizing that the fundamental theory of liberty means
that rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation that is not rationally
related to any purpose of the state); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (recognizing that specific provisions
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras that create zones of privacy); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155
(determining that a state may not infringe upon a fundamental right without a compelling
justification); Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (affirming Roe and recognizing that aspects of liberty are
protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause).
99. See, e.g., Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (acknowledging the Court's role in protecting the rights of
private schools from "unwarranted compulsion" by the state); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485
(recognizing the Court's duty to protect freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights by prohibiting
overbroad government regulation); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (noting the Court's ability to balance
legitimate state interests and fundamental rights of individuals); Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (discussing
the Court's function of using "reasoned judgment" when interpreting the Constitution and
adjudicating substantive due process claims).
100. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 612-13 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It
is not that Ginsburg's dissent expressly makes the distinction from substantive due process cases. It
does not. It does, however, expressly make a case for both a lack of institutional competence and a
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If constitutional doctrine does not seem to help much, perhaps another
pocket of high legal academy-economic analysis of law-will help. On
this view, there really is a test for the rationality of damages awards: how
defensible they are as deterrents to socially wasteful conduct. A number of
important scholars have argued that, because of the costs of detecting tortious
conduct that causes harm, there would be a serious problem of under-
enforcement in actions for compensatory damages alone. 10' Hence, extra-
compensatory damages serve to supplement compensatory damages in such a
manner that a rational actor with awareness of under-enforcement problems
would nonetheless consider the externalized costs of its actions, because the
prospect of extra-compensatory damages for torts that have actually been
detected in effect warrant doing so. 10 2 In order to make that prospect real, the
extra-compensatory damages must then in fact be enforced. When courts
refer to punitive damages, the theory goes, this is what they mean. While the
aforementioned view would seem to favor the maintenance of punitive
damages (which, in some ways, it does), it tends also to suggest some
reconstruction of what would make a particular award rational or irrational.
Hence, to the extent that a particular scheme is untethered from a conception
of the appropriate deterrent for motivating a profit-maximizing agent, it
would be fair game for a critique of punitive damages awards from a law and
economics point of view.
There are at least three problems with an economic view of the punitive
damages award, at least as an effort to unpack Gore. First, it simply does not
engage the relevant constitutional text and history. Indeed, it has nothing
whatsoever to do with rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution. And so,
while the economic view of punitive damages might work as a policy for
striking down an award, it does not make sense at the Supreme Court, at least
if one takes jurisdictional considerations at all seriously. Second, it is far
from obvious that it succeeds in explaining why Gore would seem
unacceptable to the average lawyer, for the $2 million dollar award may
indeed be appropriately large for the purpose of providing an incentive for
lack of functional arguments for exercising judicial power here. Id. ("The Court is not well
equipped for this mission [of reviewing state court damage awards].").
101. That is, legal actors would be inclined to take socially unjustifiable risks of injury where
those injuries would not likely be traced back to the actors. In this way, compensating actual
discovered injury victims at simply the costs of their injury would be sufficient to lead defendants to
take appropriate precautions. Punitive damages arguably fix this problem. They involve
threatening potential tortfeasors as follows: Even if we do not catch your every tort, when we do
catch you, you will pay multiple damages.
102. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869, 889-96 (1998) (emphasizing, principally, the under-detection and
under-enforcement rationales for damages beyond compensatories). The law and economics
literature on punitive damages is broad and deep in ways that I cannot, and do not, attempt to
capture here. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 79 (1982) (utilizing economic theory to develop punitive damage award standards); Keith N.
Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998)
(constructing a punitive damages standard based on economic penalty theory).
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BMW to correct its failures to reveal defects to consumers. Third, and
conversely, this theory tends to undermine the soundness of huge swaths of
punitive damages law, particularly those parts that require willfulness and
those parts that fail to treat the flagrancy and obviousness of a misdeed as a
reason not to award punitive damages. 10 3 While it would be interesting as an
engine for policy change, the economic theory is not plausible either as a
descriptive account of the actual tort doctrine or as an interpretation of the
substance of the constitutional issues overlaying the tort doctrine.
A broader realist, functionalist, or public choice perspective does not
help rationalize Gore either, at least not as a legal matter. It is tempting to
argue that choices to engage in judicial review are not really a matter of
constitutional text, basic rights, or common law monitoring; they are aspects
of the courts' role as a corrective device where other institutions have not
stepped in.1°4 This is clearly the sort of role O'Connor has developed in her
important opinions in the area of punitive damages, particularly those leading
up to Gore.'0 5 But the problem with this argument is decisively pointed out
by Ginsburg's dissenting opinion. The institutional design argument would
seem to fail on every front: first, and most obviously, tort law is traditionally
the prerogative of the states; °6 second, there is a tremendous amount of
activity at the state judicial and legislative level working on the problem; 10 7
third, there has been action at the Congressional level.108 Moreover, it would
seem that the Court is peculiarly ill-designed to determine what sorts of
restrictions are demanded by today's economy.'0 9  Indeed, Justice
O'Connor's view that the punitive damages system is broken and therefore
needs to be fixed-like the law and economics account described above-
would seem to be totally vulnerable to the charge of Lochnerizing.
110
103. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993) (citing "the
bad faith of petitioner" as a reason for upholding the large punitive award); David G. Owen, A
Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1994),
cited in Gore, 517 U.S. at 576 (noting that rather than being a reason not to award punitives, "It]he
flagrancy of the misconduct is thought to be the primary consideration in determining the amount of
punitive damages").
104. Mark Geistfeld understands the Court as engaged in this sort of project. See Mark
Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
105. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Court should overturn a punitive damages verdict because "the State's mechanism
for postverdict judicial review ... is incapable of curing a grant of standardless discretion to the
jury"); TXO, 509 U.S. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should overturn a
"monstrous award" because state law "procedures... were wholly inadequate").
106. Gore, 517 U.S. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 607-08, apps. I, II, & Il.
108. See, e.g., Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
(1995) (unsuccessfully proposing to limit punitive damages awards to "3 times the amount of
damages awarded to the claimant for the economic loss on which the claimant's action is based, or
$250,000, whichever is greater").
109. Gore, 517 U.S. at 613.
110. For the same reasons, I am skeptical about whether the empirical research carried out by
Sunstein, Kahneman, and others on jury findings in punitive damages has any capacity to support a
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If these critical remarks are correct, then the right story to tell about
Gore is that it is a hard case that made bad law. Frequently these are cases
where judges are so dissatisfied with the result reached by the
decisionmakers below that they cannot resist the idea of making a different
decision; so gripped by the idea that injustice will result if they do not act,
they allow themselves to reshape the law. But because the law itself does not
generate any sound basis-the Court is solely correcting the facts of the prior
decision-the law needs to be modified to make room for a just resolution of
the particular case. Unless there is a rationale for the modification or
reshaping that is independent of the fact pattern and posture of the case, the
legal change may turn out to be unjustifiable and unwise. That is how hard
cases make bad law. Gore seems to fit this mold: five justices were caught
off guard by the flagrant and almost comical injustice of Dr. Gore walking
away with $2 million because of an invisible flaw in the paint of his BMW.
They therefore permitted themselves to reach out and strike down the award
as "unconstitutional," despite the absence of any sound basis for doing so.
Nine years after the decision, we cannot simply shrug our shoulders and
say that even if Gore was illegitimate as binding law, it was fine on the facts
and it was just one case. Since Gore, the Supreme Court has been
increasingly aggressive on punitive damages, deciding in Leatherman that de
novo review is warranted,"' and later advancing its doctrine and contracting
its presumptions in Campbell.112 Moreover, hundreds of courts around the
country have now followed Gore, and it may well play a significant role in
untold other cases. 113  And there is fluidity; we do not know where the
Court's punitive damages law will be going. Although the decision in Gore
is a legal curiosity, it is not merely a curiosity. We need a way of thinking
about Gore that begins to hang together as something other than the worst
kind of Lochnerizing and Supreme Court motivated tort reform, slid through
the Court by a talented team of defense lawyers who were able to convince
five justices only because of the ludicrous facts of the case.
reconstruction of Gore (which is not, to be fair, their aim). See e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ET AL.,
PUNITrIvE DAMAGES: How JuRIEs DECIDE (2002). There is, moreover, reason to be skeptical about
the putative incompetence of juries to assess punitive damages coherently. See, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Martin T. Wells, Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with
Real-World Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239 (2002) (criticizing claims
about incoherence); Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom & David Rottman,
Judges, Juries, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002)
(finding that juries and judges do not perform substantially differently in assigning punitive
damages, and both are relatively coherent and predictable); Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian
Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEG.
STUD. 623 (1997) (finding that evidence undercuts the contention that juries are unreliable and
erratic on punitive damages).
111. 532 U.S. 424,436(2001).
112. 538 U.S. 408, 419-29 (2003).
113. See Bussell, supra note 74, at 348 (discussing the various methods by which lower courts
have attempted to follow the Gore decision, despite widespread confusion with its reasoning).
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To say that Gore is difficult to justify is quite different from saying that
it is difficult to explain in causal or historical terms. The Court's turn in
Gore can be understood as simply a change in course due in part to changed
personnel and in part to changed opinion. Of the five-justice majority in
Gore, two-O'Connor and Stevens-had maintained this position all along
on the Court, beginning with their (partial) dissent in Browning-Ferris."
14
Two more-Justices Souter and Breyer-replaced Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, who had voted against punitive damages review in Browning-
Ferris.115 While Justices Brennan and Blackmun each maintained a strong
attraction to due process review, each was clearly ambivalent. 16 Justices
Souter and Breyer, by contrast, had consistently displayed the frugal New
Englanders' skepticism about inflated punitive damages, and neither had ever
rejected a constitutional argument against them at the Supreme Court. And
so the turnover in court personnel went two-thirds of the way to making the
change from two votes (in Browning-Ferris) to a majority of five in Gore.
The fifth vote was Justice Kennedy's, and it did reflect a change.
Kennedy's Browning-Ferris vote, although unaccompanied by an individual
opinion, likely represented a general disinclination to embark upon judicial
review of genuine criminal fines imposed by the government,1 17 as well as
discomfort with the apparent softness on the civil-criminal distinction in
double jeopardy cases.' 18 But his due process decisions tell an intriguingly
different story. Justice Kennedy's Haslip concurrence does not foreclose the
possibility that, as a substantive matter, he might accept the view espoused
by Justice O'Connor and some of the bar's tort reform wing that juries too
frequently let punitive damages run wild. And yet Justice Kennedy rejects
Justice Blackmun's suggestion, in the opinion of the Court in Haslip, that a
due process problem exists notwithstanding the Court's approval of the
actual procedure used.1 9 Like Justice Scalia, but in a manner pointedly less
tradition-bound, Justice Kennedy is unwilling to indulge his desire to strike
down this unreasonable damages award because he thinks it is wrong to use
114. 492 U.S. 257, 282-301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 259, 262 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 276-77 (reserving the due process question for "another day"); id. at 280 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (noting that the Court "leaves the door open" for a due process argument in a future
case).
117. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 344 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the majority's holding that a civil forfeiture can constitute an excessive fine under the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause).
118. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 295-96 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing
that civil in rem forfeiture following criminal punishment should not be barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause).
119. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing
that a Due Process argument does not make sense as a rationale for striking down a punitive
damages award except insofar as the size of the award is understood to reflect bias or prejudice;
otherwise, jury procedure deemed proper constitutes Due Process).
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an untethered, non-procedural due process argument to do so, and he finds no
other hook.12
0
Just three years later, in Gore, however, Kennedy changed his vote,
abandoning the conservative bloc with which he had voted in earlier cases.
Between Haslip and Gore, the Court decided Casey,12 1 and Justice Kennedy
famously switched positions on the permissibility of substantive due
process. 122 Having taken that dive as a matter of principle, in an area where
he was at best torn on substantive grounds, and having taken heat both on
and off the Court for so doing, 123 it appears that Kennedy no longer had the
same passion for staying clear of substantive due process. To put it more
bluntly, he had no remaining reason to refrain from pushing what he thought
was the substantively right framework for punitive damages under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 124 And so he added his vote
to Stevens's, and the Court struck down its first case. Kennedy has not
turned back, and his decision for a six-member majority in Campbell plainly
adopts the most aggressive approach the Court has taken to punitive
damages. 125 The defendant won a victory in Gore for a simple reason: the
votes were there.
A realistic analysis of the individualized Justices' thinking in Gore also
sheds light on Justice Stevens's majority opinion in particular. Earlier, I
expressed puzzlement at the vocabulary of "excessiveness" and of a
"constitutional line," and I expressed concern that the Court had embraced a
three-part substantive test for whether the line had been crossed, even though
it was putatively due process at issue, not the Excessive Fines Clause.
However, if Justice Stevens appeared enamored of an "excessiveness" idea
reminiscent of an Eighth Amendment proportionality review, it is because he
is enamored of that view; indeed, he was the only Justice to sign on to Justice
O'Connor's (partial) dissent in Browning-Ferris, which articulated an
excessiveness and Eighth Amendment proportionality inquiry to be used for
punitive damages. 126 Having the votes in Gore and having the prerogative to
write for the majority, Justice Stevens recycled the Browning-Ferris
framework and placed it under the Due Process Clause, now utilizing the
120. Id.
121. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
122. Id. at 849.
123. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (taking Justice Kennedy to task
for "erroneous citation" to prior opinions that Justice Scalia had joined); Nancy E. Roman, "Wimp
Bloc" Disappoints Right Wing, WASH. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at Al (noting conservatives'
disappointment with Republican appointees to the Supreme Court following the Casey decision).
124. Cf E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539-40 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (expressing preference for using due process arguments over
takings arguments in striking down economic regulation).
125. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418-29 (holding jury's $145
million punitive damage award unconstitutional in light of Gore guideposts).
126. 492 U.S. 257, 282-301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"unreasonableness" and "gross excessiveness" language, 127 language that had
been officially blessed by the Court in dicta in Haslip128 and TXO. 129
Confirmation of Stevens's Eighth Amendment orientation to punitive
damages is provided by passages in his subsequent punitive damages opinion
in Leatherman with which he frames the standard of review issue:
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the
imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion. That
Clause makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the states.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Due
Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from
imposing "grossly excessive" punishments on tortfeasors, Gore, 517
U.S., at 562; TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 453-55 (1993) (plurality opinion). 130
Justice Stevens then goes on to state that "[t]he Court has enforced those
limits in cases involving deprivations of life; deprivations of liberty; and
deprivations of property."'131 Under deprivations of life and deprivations of
liberty, he expressly cites Eighth Amendment cases. 132  And under
deprivations of property he cites United States v. Bajakajian,133 and Gore,134
strongly suggesting that he believes both cases are excessive fines cases, but
that, for whatever reasons, the Court has simply decided to say that the
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment applies to punitive damages
without the authority of the Eighth Amendment, but only through the Due
Process Clause directly. 135 And one suspects that this is because Browning-
127. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
128. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (recognizing that the Due Process Clause should guide the Court's
inquiry into the reasonableness of punitive damages).
129. 509 U.S. 443, 458-59 (1993) (echoing the position in Haslip that a general concern of
reasonableness should guide determinations of whether a punitive damages award is too excessive
and in violation of the Due Process Clause).
130. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001).
131. Id. at 434.
132. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279, 303 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 787, 801 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
133. 524 U.S. 321 (1998). The Leatherman opinion's parenthetical on Bajakajian reads: "civil
forfeiture of $357,144 for violating reporting requirement was 'grossly disproportionate' to the
gravity of the offense." 532 U.S. at 434.
134. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996). The parenthetical for Gore
reads: "($2 million punitive damages award for failing to advise customers of minor predelivery
repairs to new automobiles was 'grossly excessive' and therefore unconstitutional)."
135. Cf Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, "Pricking the Lines": the Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 881 (2004) (citing Bajakajian for the
proposition that "[t]he Court has also identified a gross disproportionality principle under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment"); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 732-33 (2005) (also citing Bajakajian for its
Eighth Amendment implications). Although not focused on the problem of Gore interpretation or
2005]
Texas Law Review
Ferris cut off the express Eighth Amendment route, and the slightly
reconstituted Court (with a changed Kennedy) has decided to change course
and adopt the excessive fines argument, but needs a new label to appear
consistent. 36
The "changed course" explanation of Gore should supply no greater
comfort than Scalia's "substantive due process" interpretation and leaves us
equally in need of a satisfactory theoretical justification. First, and most
obviously, the Court is not entitled simply to change its mind within a few
years without giving any reasons for doing so, and the failure to own up to it
only exacerbates the problem-if a true overruling is what is occurring.
Second, although O'Connor's reasons for deeming the Eighth Amendment
applicable were not without force, seven members of the Court articulated a
powerful and unmet reason for rejecting the Eighth Amendment: both
historically and as a matter of principle, Eighth Amendment "fines" seem to
connote the idea of the state as the one exacting the fine.137 Third, and taking
a more charitable view, Stevens's approach seems to be placing an Eighth
Amendment type of idea (not the Excessive Fines Clause as such) under the
rubric of the Due Process Clause. This idea is quite obscure: while lawyers
have some sense of what it means for the Due Process Clause to incorporate
the Eighth Amendment, we really have no sense of what it means for an
Eighth Amendment excessiveness idea to apply as a matter of due process
when the Eighth Amendment itself is said not to be implicated-or, more
precisely, we really have no sense what it means unless it is the kind of free-
floating normative oversight that Scalia contemptuously labels "substantive
due process."
Finally, the mixed Eighth Amendment-Due Process rationale that
seems, in some sense, to be engaging the Court today is far from inert.
Leatherman provided a very powerful tool for defendants by embracing a de
novo standard that depended heavily upon an Eighth Amendment idea. 138
Equally troubling, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Campbell does not limit
itself to a "just too big" excessiveness standard that might be folded under an
on punitive damages as an aspect of tort law, Karlan's and Lee's articles display the overlap of (and
differences between) the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions "proper" (on the one hand) and Gore
and its progeny (on the other), and have in that way influenced my view of the subject. Karlan also
develops the idea that punitive damages may be, in effect, more plausibly targeted for effective
review because they do not emerge from a legislative process, a point I make use of in Part VII,
infra.
136. Cf TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458-59 n.24 (1993)
(noting, with irony, that Scalia's critique of Stevens's majority opinion for engaging in Lochner-era
substantive due process and enumerated rights review is inconsistent with Scalia's recognition that
the Due Process Clause incorporates substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights, one of which is
the Excessive Fines Clause).
137. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 257,
266 (1989).
138. 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).
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Eighth Amendment knock-off (whatever that means). 139 Rather, his opinion
for the Court enumerates the kind of inquiry and the kind of factors that may
permissibly be considered to be part of the reason for a punitive damages
award; genuine process considerations appear to be leaking back in. 40 In
short, it should be of no solace that we can, looking back, say that Justice
Stevens in Gore was constructing a constitutional rationale with more of a
shape to it than just "substantive due process." For what we find, if we try to
connect the dots, is a misshapen hybrid of Eighth Amendment and Due
Process rationales, which only deepens the instability and apparent
illegitimacy of the Court's decision.
III. The Double Aspect Problem in the Theory of Punitive Damages
At the end of the day, I do not really hold this skeptical view. I think
that, all considered, Gore is rightly decided. Moreover, I think Gore is
powerful as a "study" case, because there is something about its factual
scenario that appears to provide a hint as to why constitutional scrutiny for
punitive damages might make sense. My methodological conjecture is that if
we can begin to identify what makes the case striking, this may help us
identify an underlying structural feature relevant to legal analysis that the
case illustrates. And my substantive conjecture, following this method, is
that the four million dollar damages award by the jury (and even the two
million dollar award after appellate review) seems so extraordinary relative
to the wrong done to Gore, that one is really pressed to see Gore himself as
anything but a true bounty hunter. Put differently, even after a great dose of
deference on fact-finding, it just makes no sense to see Gore's verdict as
representing what is owed to him as plaintiff in a civil action; it seems
evident that Alabama is imposing a criminal fine, and rewarding the person
functioning as a private attorney general. What is missing in Gore is the
ambiguity of a punitive damages award that is, in some sense, truly damages
to the plaintiff-victim in a civil tort action and, in another sense, a fine
imposed by the state as punishment for wrongful conduct and collected by
the one who brought the litigation. In Gore, it is so overwhelmingly the
second, criminal, aspect that dominates, that it is hard to take the first, civil
(tort) aspect seriously as anything but a formality. But of course, to say this
is only to articulate an inchoate conjecture as to what is peculiar about the
case; we need much more to explain it, for the phrases "in some sense" and
"in another sense" are just placeholders, doing all the work. An explanation
of Gore would need to fill in the blanks.
If we follow this pair of conjectures, here is where we arrive: Sorting
out Gore and its progeny requires us to admit that punitive damages have a
139. 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
140. Id. at 416-71 (reasoning that a person must receive notice of both the conduct that will
create liability and the severity of the penalty that may be imposed).
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double aspect. They are in part like fines collected by the bounty hunters
who prosecute tort cases, and they are in part like damages awards in a civil
action. If they are genuinely a part of the private law-genuinely damage
awards for the plaintiff in a private cause of action-then treating them as
fines appears misplaced, as Browning-Ferris concluded. But if they are
really fines that happen to be collected as bounties, in private actions, then it
is mere formalism to deny defendants Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth
Amendment protection. The Gore Court just couldn't help but see them in
the latter light, and therefore slid into a different constitutional mold.
Because it could not actually justify the shift in perspective, it did so silently,
finding a different label. But that means that if one were to come clean on
Gore and justify it, one would need to explain why the "fines" image of
punitive damages dominates, why the "genuine damages award" image of
punitive damages just cannot hold up in Gore.
Explaining the differing images of punitive damages in Gore and some
of its predecessors (like Browning-Ferris) is no small matter. For one thing,
the Court is not explicit about what I have claimed, and indeed, expressly
says it is doing something different. Moreover, while the idea of resting
constitutional protection for facially civil remedies on the recasting of those
remedies as criminal is not alien to the Court, in light of the Mendoza-
Martinez14 1 to Halper142 line of cases in Double Jeopardy Clause
jurisprudence, that line of cases has come to a sort of non-confidence vote in
United States v. Ursery,143 where the Court expressed in strong terms its
distaste for this kind of approach. Indeed, this disinclination to
recharacterize the formally civil as criminal, is likely part of the reason that
the Gore court did not expressly soften and distinguish Browning-Ferris. 144
141. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (finding § 4010) of the
Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, and § 349(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 unconstitutional because the penalties were essentially penal in character and would inflict
severe punishment without due process of law).
142. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989) (holding that imposition of the full
amount allowed for in the statute, which was well in excess of the Government's actual loss, would
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by punishing Halper a second time for the same conduct for
which he had earlier been convicted).
143. 518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996) ("Nothing in Halper ... purported to replace our traditional
understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.").
144. Browning-Ferris was decided the same term as Halper. The latter case expressly stated
that punitive damages would not be eligible for double jeopardy protection, 490 U.S. at 450-51,
suggesting that the Rehnquist Court as a whole saw the connection between these two kinds of cases
and thought it important not to push punitive damages down the Halper line. More strikingly,
Halper itself was expressly overruled in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1997)
("We believe that Halper's deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill
considered. As subsequent cases have demonstrated, Halper's test for determining whether a
particular sanction is 'punitive,' and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause,
has proved unworkable."). Together, these two developments simultaneously: (a) tend to explain
why members of the Court would be unlikely to rely upon a Halper type of framework for punitive
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But the challenge of explaining Gore is a broader one: we would need
to be able to articulate in a comprehensible way why punitive damages have
this double aspect, and why it is sometimes appropriate to take their "public
punishment" aspect to dominate, while at other times, their private liability
aspect should be taken to dominate. To be more precise, the Supreme Court
prior to Gore seemed willing to treat punitive damages awards as immune
from the kind of scrutiny that would apply to fines, penalties, and criminal
punishments, by virtue of the fact that, at least formally (and perhaps in some
other sense, too), a punitive damages award is part of a verdict against a
defendant held by a private plaintiff in a civil damages action-this,
notwithstanding the fact that in several substantive ways it appears to be a
fine, penalty, or criminal punishment. And so the problem is: What makes a
punitive damages award qualify as a fine, penalty, or criminal punishment,
rather than mere private liability, and (conversely, and perhaps more
difficult), why does a punitive damages award (in any but the most formal
sense) genuinely count as a part of private civil liability? The "double aspect
problem" in punitive damages law, as I shall call it, is the challenge of
explaining how punitive damages fit within the fabric of tort law such that
they have these two aspects, and why there may be occasions or respects in
which one aspect rather than the other dominates for a certain type of
analysis. A solution to the double aspect problem will not fully explain
Gore, but it may tell us why Gore was the straw that broke the camel's back,
and it will begin to give us a sense of why there should be such a thing as
constitutional constraints on punitive damages law (even though there once
was not), and why one could expect this to be a complex and difficult topic
within constitutional law, not simply a set of opportunities to engage in
federal judicial tort reform.
Solving the double aspect problem requires overcoming significant
obstacles, beyond the Court's own taciturnity, and its own disinclination to
engage the civil-criminal gestalt in dealing with the applicability of
constitutional criminal provisions. Indeed, the challenge before us has more
to do with thinking about torts than thinking about constitutional law.
Nineteenth-century legal academics became engaged in a heated but not
particularly illuminating battle over punitive damages, with Theodore
Sedgwick maintaining the propriety of punitive damages145 and Simon
Greenleaf maintaining their doctrinal illegitimacy. 46  Contemporary tort
scholarship is, for the most part, ill-equipped to deal with the double aspect
damages; and (b) create a high threshold for any analysis of punitive damages seeking to reconstruct
a framework that would be usable for the Court.
145. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 515-40 (5th ed.
1869) (asserting that case law supports the "salutary doctrine" of exemplary damages to punish a
tortfeasor's "gross fraud, malice, or oppression").
146. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253 (16th ed. 1899)
(arguing that damages should be "neither more nor less" than compensation for the actual injury
received).
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problem. This is for two sorts of reasons: one relating to the ordinary or
hornbook-level thinking about tort law, and a second relating to the "high
theorists" of tort law, particularly in law and economics and corrective
justice theory. First, the open-ended, functionalist paradigm of modem
American tort thinking rejects, as a false dichotomy, the following sort of
question: is a punitive damages award really serving as a punishment or
really providing compensation to a plaintiff? 47 Understanding tort law, in a
century of tort thinking dominated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, William
Prosser, and Leon Green, is understanding the idea that tort law is always
simultaneously serving multiple functions, and playing many different roles.
The sort of view that would question whether punitive damages really
represent compensation or punishment is a kind of formalism that was
rejected in tort even before it was rejected anywhere else. 148 Indeed, even
picking and choosing a "dominant" strand is a questionable task when we
understand what sort of a melting pot of purposes tort law comprises. The
particular form of functionalism and instrumentalism that has held sway in
tort has, for these reasons, pushed hard against categorizing in tort theory. 1
49
Tort scholars, courts, and legislators within this anti-categorical
functionalist tradition have certainly recognized the mix of punishment and
private compensation in punitive damages. 150  But this has rarely led to an
effort for theoretical disentanglement. Typically, the formal legal category
of punitive damages as part of civil law simply holds sway.' 5 ' Occasionally,
a policy argument is powerful enough to move a court or legislature to do a
frame shift: thus, for example, many jurisdictions are sympathetic enough
147. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages. Beyond the Public/Private
Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1079, 1090-99 (1989) (arguing that criticism of punitive damages
doctrine as anomalous wrongly presumes a public-private distinction that has been shattered in
twentieth-century legal theory). While Professor Harris's illuminating article asserts that punitive
damages theory has been too attentive to the public-private distinction, I take the opposite view:
insufficient care in thinking through the public-private distinction has been a more serious problem.
In any case, the leading and authoritative torts scholars who have written on punitive damages in the
past twenty-five years have overwhelmingly adopted a much more pluralistic approach, rather than
any kind of single-purpose or "private law" conception of punitive damages. See, e.g., Owen, supra
note 103, at 373-74 (setting forth several different functions of punitive damages, and analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of features of punitive damages in light of those functions); Gary T.
Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 134 (1982) (stating that punitive damages would be justified if they achieve
either deterrence or compensation).
148. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of this type of
categorization in tort law).
149. See John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-22
(2003) (arguing that the Prosserian, functionalist perspective is actually the most widely accepted
strain of tort theory in the twentieth century).
150. See, e.g., id. (stating that the "compensation-deterrence theory enjoys a unique status as
the only mode of theorizing about tort that has been largely spared the need to explain and justify
itself").
151. Owen, supra note 103, at 365 (noting that, although punitive damages draw on aspects of
both civil and criminal law, justifications for punitive damages liability come primarily from civil
law).
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with the "criminal" image of punitive damages that they deem them
uninsurable as a matter of public policy. 152 The preferred method for the
anti-categorical thinker to deal with what I have called the double aspect
problem is to strike a compromise. So, for example, many jurisdictions,
faced with the choice between a civil preponderance rule and a criminal
reasonable doubt rule of evidence for proving punitive damages, pick neither,
but strike a compromise with a clear and convincing evidence standard.
153
Similarly, many jurisdictions have decided that instead of treating punitive
damages as purely civil, giving them to the plaintiff, or purely criminal,
giving funds to the state, they should have split-recovery statutes that give
some to each.1
54
The United States Supreme Court's reasoning in punitive damages cases
has similarly displayed this sort of middle-of-the-road approach.
Recognizing some purposes akin to punishment but other features akin to
civil law, the Court has tried to strike a compromise. At first rejecting the
criminal categorization and adhering to the formally correct civil
categorization, the Court tried to keep things simple. 5 5 But as time went by,
the Court inched toward a compromise position; no excessive fines review,
no heavy-handed procedural due process review, but not quite nothing at
all. 156 Finally, a vague reasonableness or gross excessiveness review, tucked,
without much reason, under due process. 157 Again, this is in some ways an
attractive place for the Court to end up, and it is not particularly puzzling
how the Court ended up there. But although this "middle ground" is in some
ways attractive, I believe it is the very unarticulated and inarticulate
"compromise" quality of the Court's position in Gore that creates the
problem. For while it has expressly rejected the criminal procedure and
excessive fines routes,' 58 it has basically rejected the procedural due process
route too. 159 Its version of a compromise involves-Scalia would say-the
creation of its own tests that are not as stringent as the real tests, and have no
textual tether. This is particularly unsatisfactory when the Court (as opposed
152. Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REv.
409, 427-28 (2005) (analyzing the split among courts over insurability of punitive damages).
153. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1069 & n.1 (2000) (noting Arizona's adoption of the
clear and convincing evidence standard). Among other states, Alaska, Indiana, and South Carolina
have also adopted the clear and convincing standard. See, e.g., Robles v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc.,
29 P.3d 838 (Alaska 2001); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982); Austin
v. Specialty Trans. Servs., 594 S.E.2d 867 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
154. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
375-80 (2003) (describing and analyzing forms of split-recovery statutes). For further discussion of
Sharkey's views on punitive damages, see infra section IV(A)(3).
155. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
156. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
157. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
158. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264.
159. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17.
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to some of the Justices on it) has rejected the relevant criminal categories for
plausible reasons based on legal analysis.160 So what the "compromise" anti-
categorical mindset looks like is the creation of tests out of the blue, with no
tether, and done in the face of uncontradicted claims that the legal features
meriting special treatment are actually missing. Aside from seeming to
provide the worst of both worlds in terms of legitimacy-a pretty bad
problem, especially in any area that is patently political-the Court is also in
a very bad place in terms of practicability, predictability, and guidance. Yet
with a profoundly anti-categorical functionalism as the paradigm of ordinary
legal thinking about tort, this result is not particularly surprising.
While hornbook-level tort thinking offers little help because of its
uncompromisingly anti-categorical approach to the dual nature of punitive
damages, the "high tort theorists" in law and economics and in corrective
justice theory fail for a different, and in some ways more troubling, reason.
Each of these theoretical frameworks adopts a perspective on tort law that
selects only one aspect of the double aspect of punitive damages, and, in a
sense, cannot even see the other aspect. The law and economics approach of
Michael Polinsky and Steven Shavell, for example, takes as a fundamental
premise that tort law is a system in which private parties perform the
regulatory prosecution that our system needs, and collect a bounty for doing
so. 61 That is the whole point of tort law. Punitive damages are peculiar only
because there are structural reasons for believing that the fine should usually
be equal to the damage caused, rather than greater than it, and those reasons
are softened for punitive damages. But whether equal to or greater than
compensatories, damages are always, essentially, a fine. And this is not
remotely troubling; it is in fact the genius of our system. There is no room
here for the idea that civil liability is something quite different from a fine;
there is no purely private aspect. Corrective justice theory, as we will see
below, is scarcely better equipped to handle the double aspect problem.
In short, tort theorizing within the most prevalent frameworks is poorly
suited to attacking the double aspect problem. What we lack is a theory that
could explain why punitive damages awards, in some contexts, would be
essentially civil liability, while in other contexts they would be essentially
criminal. And we lack a theory that would explain why these different
images of punitive damages are more than formal, and are substantive in a
manner that could make a difference for the applicability of constitutional
norms. The strategy is to produce such a theory, and then to examine Gore
in that light.
160. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275-76.
161. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 102. A particularly well-done version of this argument
is in Edward L. Rubin, Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the Runcible Remedies of Common
Law, 27 Wis. L. REv. 131 (1998).
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IV. Two Approaches to the Double Aspect Problem
In the sections that follow, we will illustrate the kind of theory that
would be helpful in solving the double aspect problem by considering several
contemporary theoretical treatments of punitive damages. Although the
phrase "the double aspect problem" has not been utilized in this context
before, it is not a new idea that punitive damages have a criminal punishment
aspect and have some other aspect more akin to private law or civil
liability. 162  Scholars who have tried to identify these two areas have
struggled most to articulate the civil aspect (and my own account is no
exception). As a practical matter, then, what distinguishes the theories tends
to be their accounts of what I call the civil aspect. Nevertheless, retaining the
concept of a "double aspect problem" will be more conducive to constructing
a theory that will illuminate the structure of constitutional analysis of
punitive damages, which is largely a question of the interrelationship of the
two aspects.
The theories we consider fall into two camps, which I refer to as
"broadening compensatories," and "privatizing punishment." The first group
(Wright, 163 Redish and Mathews, 164 Calabresi, 165 and Sharkey 166) expresses
the idea that punitive damages expand the type of compensatory damages a
single victim can obtain, overcoming certain kinds of limits in tort law.
Under "privatizing punishment," there are two approaches: the first
(Colby 167) distinguishes the punishment of private wrongs from the
punishment of public wrongs; the second (Galanter and Luban168)
distinguishes punishment initiated by private parties from punishment
initiated by the state. I argue that none of these approaches is capable of
162. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in
Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 742 (1989) ("Punitive damages lie at the interface
between torts and criminal law.").
163. See Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1425, 1431 (2003) ("Properly understood and administered, punitive damages in tort law
also compensate for discrete private injuries."); see also Owen, supra note 147, at 378.
164. Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 33
EMORY L.J. 1, 15 (2004) (stating that punitive damages originated to compensate plaintiffs for
intangible or immeasurable harms).
165. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(contending that punitive or "socially compensatory" damages may be necessary in cases where
traditional compensatory damages would fall short of the actual harm caused).
166. Sharkey, supra note 154, at 389 (recognizing that a desirable "societal compensatory
component already lurks within the existing morass of punitive damages").
167. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003) (arguing that punitive
damages should not be based on the "total harm" to the public, but rather the specific harm done to
the plaintiff).
168. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1440 (1993) (arguing that punitive damages play the necessary role of
correcting injuries-public or private-that state-initiated criminal sanctions could not prosecute
and privately-initiated civil sanctions of purely compensatory damages could not remedy).
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solving the double aspect problem in punitive damages law, creating a need
for the sort of theory I will develop in Part VI.
A. Broadening Compensatories
1. Corrective Justice Theories.-First, consider the corrective justice
theorists' view of punitive damages in torts. On this view, punitive damages
are acceptable as part of the fabric of the common law of torts, so long as
they are simply compensatory damages for pain and suffering, or wounded
honor, or indignation. 169 If they aim to restore the normative equilibrium in
one of these amorphous ways, there is no reason that they should not be part
of the common law of torts. However, if that is not what they aim to do, if
they are really, as they are usually today described as being, a means of
punishment or a piece of regulatory law, then they do not properly belong to
the common law of torts as such. 170  They are really a graft onto that law.
Because they are some other kind of law-criminal law or regulatory law-
for which constitutional scrutiny is triggered, true due process scrutiny
applies, and plaintiff Gore's verdict must be struck down. Insofar as some
awards of punitive damages were ever deemed a proper part of the private
law, and not subject to constitutional scrutiny, it was because they really
were a misnomer for some category of nonpecuniary or dignitary damages.
1 7 1
This argument is of the right form to complete an analysis capable of
solving the double aspect problem. It explains why a serious form of
constitutional scrutiny should apply in Gore, notwithstanding the Court's
prior statements that punitive damages should not be subject to such scrutiny
because they are within the zone of civil damages that have historically been
deemed adequate. This theory says that punitive damages are on the cusp of
the civil form, and cross over into the true public punishment zone when they
stop being part of a civil system deferred to by the state, and start being
essentially punishment or regulation. Such an argument does not rely upon
history per se, but upon the structure of tort law and of our constitutional
system. Contentions about this structure form the backdrop for an
169. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 163, at 1431 ("Properly understood and administered,
punitive damages in tort law also compensate for discrete private injuries.").
170. Id. See also WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 135 n.25 (noting that English common law
restricted punitive damages "to cases of oppressive, arbitrary, and unconstitutional governmental
action and to cases where the defendant has calculated that the gain from misconduct will exceed
the compensation payable to the plaintiff'). For an illuminating discussion of the possibility of
more room for punitive damages in a Weinribian framework (in contract), see Curtis Bridgeman,
Note, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L.
REv. 237 (2003).
171. Weinrib and other corrective justice theorists are of course eager to accommodate punitive
damages that could be squeezed into a restitutionary or disgorgement model, too, although these
remedies are more common in property and contract. See WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 142 (stating
that the "correlativity of gain and loss is normative, not merely factual ... [as such] [t]he plaintiff is
entitled to recover ... gain[s] even without having suffered a corresponding factual loss").
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explanation of why a remedy that is genuinely part of the civil tort system
should be immune from heightened constitutional scrutiny. It is because the
remedy is not a matter of the state punishing or imposing a sanction or
modifying the distribution of goods by taking something from someone else.
It is a matter of the state restoring an order that the defendant disturbed by
tortious conduct. The state is not in the enterprise of punishment or
regulation, and therefore need not meet such standards, if the damages are
merely non-pecuniary. But once it crosses over, it can no longer say that this
is essentially something other than punishment or regulation, and procedural
demands change.
There are many problems with the substance of this effort to reconstruct
Gore. First, punitive damages have always been asserted to have a
"punitive" aspect,1 72 so it is quite unpersuasive to say that punitive damages
were once part of a purely compensatory system, but they now are not.
Moreover, Anthony Sebok has displayed in great detail that, as a historical
matter, even the idea of punitives addressing indignation was really not
principally intended to make plaintiffs whole.173 And the more general point
is that for well over a century, punitive damages have drawn the ire of critics
because they could not be squeezed into the compensatory mode. 74 Second,
the corrective justice account of civil tort law as exclusively aimed at making
the plaintiff whole, even apart from punitive damages, is quite questionable.
I have defended this claim in greater depth elsewhere, but the basic point is
familiar: the appropriateness of making whole is a (default) principle of
remedies, not the basis of liability itself. 75 And third, it is not immediately
clear why a different constitutional analysis applies when the court takes
money in order to make the plaintiff whole; it would appear that the state is
still taking money, even if it is distributing it to someone else.
176
2. Redish and Mathews.-A forcefully argued variation on the above-
mentioned theme is found in a recent article by Martin Redish and Andrew
Mathews. 77 Redish and Mathews accept that there is a long history of case
172. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B.) ("Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty,
to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the
action itself.").
173. Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History
of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 163, 185-90 (2003).
174. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text (alluding to the nineteenth-century
debate between Greenleaf and Sedgwick).
175. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 5, at 748-52 (arguing that the dominance placed
on compensatory damages should not be equated to the right for a cause of action itself).
176. But see infra text accompanying notes 199-209 (criticizing Colby's treatment of the
double aspect problem).
177. Redish & Mathews, supra note 164 (arguing that the current system of punitive damages
leads to constitutional problems specifically due to improper private and personal interests
possessed by those who impose the punishments).
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law in which punitive damages were intended, in part, to punish the
tortfeasor.178 But, like the corrective justice theorists, they contend that at the
inception of punitive damages awards, tort law did not offer compensation
for intangibles, so that punitive damages served a dual purpose of
compensating for intangibles and punishing the defendant. 79  More
precisely, Redish and Mathews contend that the punitive role was incidental
to the compensatory role. 180  Today, by contrast, tort law affords
compensatory damages for intangibles. Hence, a punitive damages award
today is not incidental to the compensation for intangibles that are sought.
Litigation for punitive damages is a naked attempt to punish the defendant.'18
Because our liberal political system requires that the coercive power of the
state be seated in the state itself, punitive damages awards today violate a
fundamental precept of our system. Indeed, it is part of due process in
punishment that the only one empowered to seek punishment is the state
itself, subject to the variety of constraints on its exercise of discretion. 182
On this view, the double aspect of the punitive damages award is rooted
in the historical fact that it served both a compensatory function and a
punitive function. It retains its character as part of civil liability, for
constitutional purposes, so long as it retains the compensatory function. But
once it becomes purely punitive, its character for constitutional purposes
switches. The coercive power of the state triggers protections, one of which
is that it is not to be concentrated in the hands of a private plaintiff.
The Redish and Mathews view deals with several problems mentioned
above. First, it concedes that punitive damages have always been used, in
part, to punish. Second, it concedes that an award sometimes serves both
compensatory and punitive purposes. And third, it explains why damages
awards sometimes shift into a constitutional box befitting punishments.
Nevertheless, several problems remain, and some new ones enter the
picture. The first problem was mentioned above: so long as the court is
taking money from the defendant for something he allegedly did, why does it
matter whether one of the reasons for taking it is to compensate? This
question is even more acute than it was for corrective justice theorists,
because Redish and Mathews are conceding an aim by the state to punish in
both cases. If the aim is there, and the taking is there, why does it matter,
constitutionally, whether another aim is also there?
A second, and in some ways deeper, problem is a confusion concerning
the coercive power of the state. Whatever the purpose of the liability and
178. Id. at 14-15.
179. Id. (stating that courts in the early nineteenth century "began to explain exemplary
damages by reference to concepts of punishment").
180. Id. at 15.
181. Id. at 18-19.
182. Id. at 45-48 (discussing neutrality as a due process requirement for government advocates
asserting coercive state power).
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wherever the funds will go once paid, the coercive power of the state is being
used in some sense. First, it is being used by the state, which seems
unproblematic, and indeed the plaintiff cannot do anything coercive to
enforce her rights, unless the state authorizes it. But let us suppose that it is
problematic because the plaintiff, not the state, is initiating the suit (a much
weaker point). Again the coercive power of the state is being used by the
private party. There is concededly no unconstitutionality about this when
compensatory damages alone are sought. The power to punish and the
coercive power are not the same; the coercive power exists whether
punishment or compensation is exacted.
A third problem is that Redish and Matthews's view is historically
inaccurate in a manner that is subtle but nevertheless important. While some
of the historical role of punitive damages did involve intangible harm that is
now compensable, it is not correct that: (a) compensating intangible harm,
and (b) imposing public punishment, together comprised the goals or
endorsed functions of punitive damages law. The courts saw punitive
damages as vindicating the plaintiff and raising his status, not simply
compensating him for intangible harm.183  Such a vindicative function
remains significant today, and is not mooted by the greater availability of
damages for intangible harm. Therefore, the availability of damages for
intangible harm under today's law does not, contra Redish and Mathews,
yield the conclusion that today's punitive damages verdicts are simply
exercises of the power to punish.
Finally, and relatedly, it seems that the Redish and Mathews account
relies on a conception of the plaintiffs motivation, but offers little by way of
realistic description of such motivation. The problem is that if we ask why a
plaintiff seeks punitive damages, there probably is no one answer: the desire
to punish the defendant may be part of the answer, but so too may be the
desire to obtain money as compensation for the harm. Moreover, if we are
going to be realistic about a plaintiffs motivation and needs, we must
recognize that many needs are still not met-attorneys' fees and the
intangible costs and frustrations of litigation being major components.
Ultimately, then, the Redish and Mathews article suggests that we say the
mix is different, that the relative magnitudes of private and public are
different today than in centuries past. But it does not tell us (and, to be fair,
does not purport to tell us) why this is not true for all punitive damages
awards today (or for the past century, roughly). It does not give us a useful
183. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 147, at 1085-87 (observing that punitive damages either
evolved from the juries' practice of awarding large damages for public outrage or as a way of
compensating victims for intangible harms); Galanter & Luban, supra note 168, at 1432-33
(explaining that the wrongdoer has asserted superiority over the victim and the punishment serves to
reassert the true relative value of the wrongdoer and victim); Owen, supra note 103, at 375-77
(observing that punitive damages restore the equality of the victim by removing the extra worth and
freedom stolen by the thief); Sebok, supra note 173, at 200-01 (reasoning that punitive damages
allowed the victim to recover his lost honor).
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tool for thinking about why one sort of mix is more permissible. And it does
not tell us why the different mix should be deemed to constitute a move from
essentially civil to essentially penal.
3. Social Compensatory Damages.-One significant variation on the
idea of broadening compensatories deserves greater consideration than space
permits me here. In his characteristically distinctive concurring opinion in
Ciraolo v. City of New York, Judge Guido Calabresi introduces the idea of
socially compensatory damages.'8 4 Professor Catherine Sharkey has offered
a systematic development of this idea in her important article, Punitive
Damages as Societal Damages.185 Sharkey claims that punitive damages are
justifiable because they represent an internalization of the social costs of
tortious conduct, costs that go beyond the plaintiff.186 She recommends-
following several jurisdictions that have enacted statutes to this effect-that
some of the punitive damages award be funneled to victims of such tortious
conduct other than the plaintiff, as compensation for their injuries and to
produce the desired regulatory effect.' 87 The "social compensatory" analysis
of punitive damages can therefore be understood as broadening
compensatories by broadening the domain of beneficiaries of the damages
award, not by expanding the kind of damages that go to the plaintiff.
Neither Calabresi's opinion nor Sharkey's article puts forward the idea
of social compensatory damages as an effort to reconstruct or justify Gore or,
indeed, to address the constitutionality of punitive damages more generally;
to that extent, it is somewhat speculative to address the import of that
theoretical apparatus for the questions before us now. The idea would be,
presumably, that a purely civil aspect of punitive damages exists where those
damages can be reconstructed as social compensatory damages. To the
extent (if any) that punitive damages cannot be so reconstructed-or
reconstructed as some other form of compensatory damages-the
characterization of punitive damages in terms of its criminal aspect would
apply, and would presumably call for greater constitutional scrutiny.
The short response to this conjectured theory is that everything turns on
how one resolves a certain ambiguity in the other-victims'-damages
rationale. If the rationale is, in part, that other victims really do have claims,
184. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
During the editing of this Article, Judge Calabresi sent me proofs of his chapter, Guido Calabresi,
The Complexity of Torts-The Case of Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 333 (M. Stuart
Madden, ed. 2005). Judge Calabresi's chapter, like the present article, takes as a starting point that
an understanding of punitive damages requires a recognition of the different normative ideas packed
into this remedy. His analysis of the strands of punitive damages to be explained, and his
explanation of these strands, differs in most respects from my own, and is consistent with his views
in Ciraolo.
185. Sharkey, supra note 154.
186. Id. at 389.
187. See id. at 375-80 (citing split-recovery legislation in Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah).
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and it is salutary to use the punitive damages mechanisms for rendering those
claims actionable, then it makes sense to see punitive damages as a peculiar
form of civil remedy for an aggregate of potential claimants. In that case,
however, a great deal more analysis will be needed to make the case that it is
permissible to side-step aggregative devices, such as class actions, that are
usually thought necessary from a civil procedural point of view. As a matter
of positive law, such detail is plainly missing; it is an interesting question
whether Sharkey's considerable progress in that direction (aiming at possible
legislative revision) will ultimately be sustainable.1 88
If, on the other hand, the rationale is that consideration of other victims'
harm is necessary for an efficient sanction (which then might productively be
turned over to the actual victims), then we are not really relying on the idea
of other victims' claims. But in that case, the justificatory basis for making
the defendant vulnerable to a damages award of that magnitude ultimately
relies on the power of the state to exact a penalty matching the harm done.
We are no longer dealing with a compensatory rationale for the justification,
and therefore social compensatory damages really fall on the criminal side of
the divide, i89 or at least on a regulatory side, which, I argue below, faces a
similarly steep procedural challenge.190
B. Privatizing Punishment
1. Private Wrongs.-Let us now turn to an entirely different line of
argument put forward in an important article by Thomas Colby. 91 Unlike
most of the other articles I have discussed, Colby is expressly concerned with
what I have labeled "the double aspect problem," both in light of Gore (and
other Supreme Court decisions), and more pointedly in light of double
jeopardy issues.' 92  Colby argues that so long as punitive damages are
intended to punish private wrongs, they are legitimately within the tort law,
but that once they are intended to punish public wrongs, they become
essentially criminal punishments.' 93 In that case, they would be subject to
188. See generally id. at 392-410. Sharkey addresses the question of whether plaintiffs' rights
would be adequately protected in such a reconceiving of punitive damages, as well as concerns over
defendant protection from multiple separate damages. Id. at 404, 408-09. However, she does not
devote substantial attention to what I regard as the more critical concern: defendants' due process
rights with regard to non-plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages, which would appear to
circumvent a large number of procedural and substantive demands that are in place in other forms of
aggregate litigation, including class actions.
189. The argument in the text reflects, in part, my learning from Anthony J. Sebok, Deterrence
or Disgorgement? Reading Ciraolo After Campbell, 64 MD. L. REv. 541, 569 (2005) (arguing that
"the... theory of socially compensatory damages must be subjected to the same due process
scrutiny as any private penalty").
190. See infra section IV(B)(2) (arguing that the Constitution might not permit the delegation of
state regulatory functions to private parties in the form of unbounded punitive damages).
191. Colby, supra note 167.
192. Id. at 592-601. However, Colby does not name or identify the problem as such.
193. Id. at 638-39.
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double jeopardy protection, as well as the protection of serious due process
constraints, which they fail. 194 The Court's willingness to accept punitive
damages verdicts in prior cases may have reflected an inclination to treat the
imposition of damages for private wrongs as a genuine aspect of tort law.1 95
Where jurisdictions have permitted a boundary crossover to occur, the
awards are properly subject to serious constitutional scrutiny. 196 Gore is an
example of such a case, as Colby points out.' 9 7 This account is attractive in
that it concedes that a punishment of wrongs has been essential to punitive
damages all along. Relatedly, it is also much more plausible as an effort to
construe punitive damages as having changed over the past several decades.
And yet Colby's account also suffers from four serious difficulties. The
first problem is that the punishment of private wrongs is still punishment, and
it is therefore hard to explain why constitutional scrutiny appropriate to
criminal punishment should apply to punishment of public wrongs but not to
punishment of private wrongs. Colby in effect concedes this problem,
writing that "it is at least understandable, if still a bit disquieting, that the
defendant is deprived of criminal procedural safeguards."1 98 Insofar as he
has a response, it appears to be purely positivistic and historicist:
Thus, a number of commentators (along with two Justices) have noted
that punitive damages, under their modem conception, clearly appear
to meet the test for requiring criminal procedural protections. The
only way to avoid this conclusion, and to take advantage of the
historical shield against constitutional challenge, is to constrain
punitive damages to their historical role as punishment for private
wrongs.
In sum, if punitive damages were to be cut loose entirely from their
historical moorings in the harm to the plaintiff, and set adrift in a sea
of constitutional doubt, they could no longer lay claim to the only
defense against constitutional challenge that has sustained them-their
historical pedigree.' 
99
This response is disappointing for a number of reasons. Most notably, it
is probably not a sound constitutional principle that history carries
194. Id. at 657.
195. Id. at 648.
196. Id. at 594, 648-49.
197. Id at 592.
198. Id. at 638.
199. Id. at 650. The text of Colby's article surrounding the quoted passage is more ambiguous
than the quotation suggests. It notes that the Court deemed punitive damages non-penal because
they were "calibrated by reference to the private injury," id. at 649 (citing O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233
U.S. 318, 324-25 (1914)), and asserts that the Blackstonian distinction between public wrong and
private wrong retains currency with the Court. Id. To this extent, Colby might seem to be
suggesting that the private-wrong-public-wrong distinction not only enjoys a historical pedigree in
fact, but merits that pedigree in light of the way the law draws its distinctions. My view is that the
text quoted, and the reliance on historical pedigree asserted throughout the article, ultimately lead to
the conclusion that Colby is advocating a purely pedigree-based view.
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dispositive weight in defining constitutional rights, and it appears that only
Justice Scalia and perhaps Justice Thomas even nominally accept it.
200
Second, punitive damages are grandfathered into constitutional protection
because they were historically permitted, but if the courts permit punitive
damage awards in order to punish public wrongs, those awards then leave the
boundaries of that due process grandfathering. And it is certain that the two
justices most eager to accept a historicist premise would not accept it in that
form.
201
A second problem is that Colby's history is probably distorted and
incomplete. Sebok's work suggests that punitive damages traditionally
served multiple purposes, including deterring potential tortfeasors from in-
juring any number of people, not just the plaintiff.202 From the beginning,
they were called "exemplary damages," and the capacity of the damages
award to achieve fairly broad deterrence unrelated to the plaintiff struck
many courts as important.20 3
Third, and to my mind most fundamentally, Colby does not say enough
about what a private wrong is. If "private wrong" is defined as a wrong to a
private person-such as a battery to a particular person-then it is
understandable why it is called "private," but not understandable why it is
not a public wrong as well, for certainly this is an affront to the public peace,
and the sort of thing for which prosecutors, within the executive branch, seek
punishment. If a private wrong is defined as something that is not
sufficiently important to the public as a wrong to merit punishment or
regulation, then one avoids the punishment-regulation problem, but only at
an extraordinary cost, for overwhelmingly punitive damages are made
available in cases that are not unimportant in this sense.
Colby selects the first horn of the dilemma, conceding that a given act
could be both a private wrong and a public wrong.204 And he concedes that
this sort of wrong could be subject both to punitive damages, as a matter of
privately initiated civil liability, and to some other penalty, depending on the
200. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(setting forth a purely historicist and history-bound interpretation of the meaning of due process for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). While Thomas was not on the
Court when Haslip was decided, his concurrence in Scalia's Gore dissent, which relied upon
Haslip, suggests (along with a variety of other decisions displaying similar historicism) that he
agrees with Scalia on the dispositiveness of historical practice.
201. The Scalia dissent in Gore, in which Thomas concurred, renders doubtful the possibility
that these two Justices would accept Colby's historical argument. They are skeptical of any effort
to create a due process problem for a procedure that has historically passed muster. BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 600 (1996) ("At the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was well understood that punitive damages represent the assessment by the jury, as
the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment the defendant deserved.").
202. Sebok, supra note 173, at 197.
203. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982) (recounting the history of punitive damages and depicting deterrent
aims).
204. Colby, supra note 167, at 630.
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circumstances.2 °5 It is hard to accept, however, that what we think of as the
private wrong is only punished with punitive damages. And conversely, it is
hard to accept that the criminal punishment meted out is only for the public
wrong, not for the private wrong. And so, when a state incarcerates someone
for a violent sexual assault, for example, the prison term is a punishment for
the defendant's having committed a wrong upon a particular private person
(the victim), not just for the offense to society that such an act represents.
The fact that this wrong rises to the level of being a public wrong does not
show that it is only the wrong to the public that is being punished. So the
general proposition that procedural safeguards are not necessary when the
punishment is punishment of a private wrong is unwarranted. More
precisely, one would expect punishment of a private wrong that is also a
public wrong-if it is really punishment-to meet the standards required for
criminal punishments.
Finally, in conformity with his general view that punitive damages are a
form of punishment, Colby agrees that the purposes of such punishment are
retributive and deterrent.206  And he also displays appreciation for the
deterrence analysis of economists such as Polinsky and Shavell, who argue
207that hard-to-detect wrongdoing requires higher deterrence. There is
nothing inherently wrong with Colby's acceptance of these views, but they
undercut a central practical inference he tries to draw from his work: that a
large punitive damages verdict, such as that awarded in Gore, is
constitutionally defective, and that, more broadly, plaintiffs should not be
permitted to introduce evidence of other wrongful conduct by defendant.
Colby fairly infers from his theory that a plaintiff should not be permitted to
punish a defendant for harm to other parties.20 8 But this does not undercut
the permissibility of large damages keyed to the need for heightened deter-
rence of certain wrongs. And, moreover, evidence of a pattern of conduct
rarely detected would appear to be highly relevant evidence for the jury to
consider if the jury wishes to deter acts like those committed against the
plaintiff. So, even if retribution for harm to others is not a permissible basis
for consideration of those other acts, deterrence of future acts like the private
wrong upon the plaintiff would be a basis for such punitive damages.20 9
205. Id. at 634-35.
206. Colby, supra note 167, at 635-36, 668, 672.
207. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 102, at 887-96 (arguing for a formula for calculating
damages in which the harm caused by the defendant is "multiplied by a factor reflecting the
probability of his escaping liability").
208. See Colby, supra note 167, at 650-57.
209. The question of whether other acts should come in, under a view like Colby's, is complex
on several levels, and merits much greater scrutiny. Two important qualifications are: (1) there are
reasons to exclude such evidence rooted in the need to avoid prejudice; and (2) there are arguments
based on proportionality to harm as a constraint (not just a factor) for excluding such evidence.
Both Colby's analysis, and these qualifications, are especially important because Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court in Campbell, declaring the impermissibility of such evidence, appears to
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2. Privatizing Punishment.-In an obvious and historically significant
respect, Marc Galanter and David Luban's justly famous article, Poetic
Justice. Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,210 is ill-suited to solving the
double aspect problem as a means of reconstructing Gore. Galanter and
Luban published the article while TXO was pending, before the Court had
taken Gore, and before it had ever struck down a punitive damages award.
Moreover, their article was written, in part, as an argument against
constitutional review of punitive damages awards. They argue forcefully
that, notwithstanding the fact that punitive damages are a genuine form of
punishment, and not merely an aspect of liability, criminal procedural
safeguards would not be appropriate. And yet the Galanter-Luban analysis
of punitive damages is among the most illuminating on what I have called the
double aspect problem.
Their picture of the value of a system of punitive damages has three
parts. First, they argue for the necessity of punishment, over and against
liability for actual damages, on the ground that the law must be able to
prevent legal actors from treating injury to others as a mere cost of doing
business.211 Second, they offer an account of the meaning of punitive dam-
age awards. Borrowing from the legal and political philosopher Jean
Hampton,212 they argue that while certain wrongdoings send a message of the
inferiority of the victim to the injurer, punishment-including punitive
damages-operates to send a countermessage of equality.213  Third, they
argue that private punishment, both formal and informal, is more pervasive in
conform to Colby's analysis. 538 U.S. 408, 420-24 (2003) (stating that punishing reprehensible
conduct of the defendant that is not related to the plaintiff's harm is a violation of due process).
For a number of reasons, however, the issue does not end here. First, the Supreme Court in the
Eighth Amendment context seems entirely willing to give great weight to general deterrent
considerations beyond the particular act that is punished. Second, punitive damages historically
have been labeled "exemplary," as both the Court and Colby recognize. Leatherman, 532 U.S. 424,
438 n. 11. Third, as explained below, potential harm has always played a great role in punishment in
criminal law, severe punishment for attempt and conspiracy being the classic examples. See, e.g.,
People v. Schwimmer, 411 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (App. Div. 1978) ("[T]he basis of conspiratorial
liability is... to punish the firm purpose to commit a crime, while preventing the actual
commission thereof. Although constituted by agreement, the crime of conspiracy is directed at the
intended result of the agreement."). Fourth, it is hard to see why the power to inflict punishment
qua criminal law should not carry with it the lesser power to sanction in accordance with regulation,
and it is hard to see why those exercising this latter power should not, as Sharkey, Calabresi, and
most economic analysts of the law insist, think intelligently and broadly about the size of sanction
needed in terms of risk of detection and potential for repetition. See Sharkey, supra note 154, at
449-52 (arguing that jurors can and should take into account deterrence when computing punitive
damages under societal damages approach); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94
(1970) (asserting that society can collectively decide on punitive general deterrence measures that
will force actors to consider accident costs when choosing among activities).
210. 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393 (1993).
211. Id. at 1430.
212. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111-61 (1988).
213. Galanter & Luban, supra note 168, at 1432-33.
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our contemporary society than is usually admitted,214 and that punitive
damages in private tort actions are essentially a valuable form of privatized
punishment in which the state delegates the power to punish to individuals. 215
As to constitutional safeguards, they argue that the reason for a bill of rights
is to protect individuals against a state that occupies vast power, resources,
and a near-monopoly on coercive force.216 Since punitive damages are
sought by private parties, they do not call for the same constitutional
protection.2 17 More particularly, criminal procedural safeguards regarding
punishment are especially important where the rights against violent
treatment (historically, the paradigm of punishment) are at stake; in punitive
damages, they are not.218
The double aspect problem would, it seems, be handled as follows by
Galanter and Luban. Punitive damages really are an attempt to punish and to
send a message in the way that criminal punishment of a homicide intends to
send a message. To that extent, they have a criminal and public aspect. But
their role within a system of private law and civil liability is not a mere
formality, at least not for constitutional purposes. Indeed, there are
genuinely private (as opposed to public) features of punitive damages:
Private parties decide when to bring actions, against whom to bring them,
and for what conduct to bring them. Moreover, when jurors decide to award
damages, private parties benefit. The reasons our constitutional norms look
to the public-private distinction in determining applicability of criminal
procedural safeguards are implicated by this double aspect, and the result is
that the safeguards should not apply, even though punishment is occurring.
Like Colby's, this is an impressive stab at the double aspect problem.
Importantly, however, it does little to support where the Court went with
Gore. Indeed, if Galanter and Luban are right, then Gore, which applies sub-
stantial constitutional scrutiny notwithstanding that (what they would analyze
as) the private aspect does dominate, is wrongly decided.
Moreover, Galanter and Luban's article suffers from an internal
contradiction that undercuts their position. Galanter and Luban treat private
plaintiffs as those to whom the state has delegated enforcement power-in
effect, as private attorneys general. 219 The problem with this is it undercuts
the idea that constitutional norms should not apply. If the private plaintiffs
are really delegees of state power, then the awesome power of the state is
being used, albeit in a decentralized way. But if that is so, then punitive
damages should, in principle, be subject to substantial constitutional scrutiny.
Indeed, Galanter and Luban's view tends to highlight the aspect of punitive
214. Id. at 1397-99.
215. Id. at 1445-46.
216. Id. at 1457.
217. Id.
218. Id at 1458.
219. Id. at 1445.
[Vol. 84:105
A Theory of Punitive Damages
damages that Redish and Mathews plausibly argue is constitutionally
suspect: the removal of state power to punish from within the domain in
which it is constrained by legal and moral norms governing prosecutorial
choice. No doubt, Galanter and Luban are right that a variety of political
benefits flow from that independence (at least from a progressive point of
view), but the delegation and deregulation of the power to punish is not the
solution, so much as the problem.
Ironically, Galanter and Luban's account in fact seems to enhance the
problem with punitive damages. For by explaining the sense in which
punishment sends an important equalizing message, their account tends to
undercut the idea that punitive damages are not really punishment. Indeed, it
tends to support the idea that punitive damages do call for just the same sorts
of protection that attend criminal law. Similarly, to a large extent Anthony
Sebok's analysis of the vindicative function of punitive damages tends to
draw from a Hampton-like interpretation of the equalizing meaning of
punishment and vindication; 22°  this likewise suggests that Sebok's
vindication-based analysis of punitive damages will not solve the double
aspect problem because it will bring punitive damages too close to public
punishment.22'
Edward Rubin has offered an account expressly paralleling Galanter and
Luban's emphasis on the "private bounty hunter" picture, but in Rubin's
view, punitive damages are a form of regulation without the "social
meaning" baggage of criminal punishment.222  Like Posner, Shavell, and
several tort theorists providing models from a law and economics point of
view,223 Rubin argues that there are numerous benefits to permitting a
privatized system of sanctions for risky conduct, and for providing private
parties with a financial incentive to carry out the litigation.
224
220. Hampton, supra note 212.
221. See Sebok, supra note 173, at 200-01 (arguing that punitive damages were meant to
demonstrate the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, thereby restoring honor to the plaintiff).
222. See Rubin, supra note 161, at 132 ("Our misimpression that [punitive] damages are
unusual, inappropriate and akin to criminal punishment comes from the same source as so many of
our other legal misimpressions-outdated attitudes derived from common law.").
223. See, e.g., WILLIM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 160-63 (1987) (asserting that punitive damages deter a potential injurer from seeking to
appropriate a right without negotiating with the owner, thereby forcing transactions into the market
and saving courts the cost of measuring actual damages); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 102, at
873-74 (arguing that, in cases where injurers sometimes escape liability for the harms they cause,
punitive damages that exceed compensatory damages will, on average, hold injurers responsible for
the full amount of harm that they cause); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic
Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 423 (1998) (asserting that punitive damages will either
incentivize offenders to internalize victim losses or eliminate the offender's prospects of gain,
thereby optimizing deterrence of socially undesirable behavior); Cooter, supra note 102, at 98
(contending that large punitive damages, when awarded in cases involving proven intentional and
gross or repeated offenses, deter future injuries and reward plaintiffs for undertaking the additional
burden of proving that fault was intentional).
224. Rubin, supra note 161, at 141-42.
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While quite interesting, and in some ways sympathetic, from a blank-
slate prescriptive point of view, Rubin's perspective offers the worst of both
worlds interpretively. As I have argued at numerous points in the article, this
type of model is unpromising as a means of capturing the common law of
punitive damages, since concepts like malice, largely alien to the regulatory
framework (and more akin to criminal law) are fundamental to punitive
damages law. 225 The model is equally unavailing on the question of why
punitive damages should, in any sense, be immune from a heavier level of
due process review than they would seem to be getting. There is no consti-
tutional rationale for permitting ad hoc state regulation of risks, delegated to
private parties, to enjoy the vague standards of liability and unbounded
226penalty levels that our punitive damages law employs. Moreover, the
forms of political accountability that exist, at a number of levels (though of
course, raising substantial issues themselves) are simply not matched in any
sense by private litigants.
227
The double aspect problem therefore remains. We have entertained,
principally, two sorts of solutions. One approach contends that punitive
damages have their civil liability aspect when they are serving a
compensatory, or make-whole, function, and cross into punishment when
they are no longer serving that function. The problem with this theory is that
it is quite insensitive, both historically and doctrinally, to the very idea of
punitive damages, which have always been at least partly punitive, and have
never really been well-explained in terms of compensatory damages. Indeed,
these damages have always been punitive within civil law. Another approach
is that punitive damages involve punishment, but punishment that is
somehow more limited in scope than that which would require constitutional
protection. This second approach treats the punishment itself as having a
double aspect: in one sense appropriate to the individual private lawsuit and
in another sense exemplifying the purposes of criminal punishment more
broadly. This approach is better interpretively attuned to punitive damages,
and more candid about its centrally punitive aspects. And it succeeds in
explaining, at least to some extent, why punitive damages are different, and
225. See Cooter, supra note 102, at 98 (arguing that punitive damages should be restricted to
intentional faults because they will deter intentional conduct that is "aggravated and constitutes
gross negligence, willful and wanton disregard for others, and the like").
226. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 46 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
O'Connor's vagueness and Mathews v. Eldridge arguments are not in any obvious or principled
way undercut by the shift to a regulatory, rather than criminal, mold. See also BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-95 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (setting out in detail problematic
features of Alabama procedure that fail to control arbitrariness in a manner that Due Process
requires). Breyer, who is sympathetic in many ways to a regulatory perspective, does not hinge his
analysis on the criminality of punitive damages.
227. Although I have been (briefly) critical of the content of Redish and Mathews's procedural
due process argument against privatizing punishment, I believe that argument, and a parallel
argument regarding regulation: (a) are promising; (b) are strengthened by the model of the private
versus public law offered herein; and (c) in any case, do require further development.
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more individual, than criminal punishment. On the other hand, by taking the
punitive aspect more seriously, it fails to create enough room for the view
that as a substantive matter, there is anything really meriting purely civil
treatment for punitive damages. Punishment of private wrongs is real
punishment, and private wrongs are often simultaneously criminal wrongs;
why they should be subject to less scrutiny is obscure. Similarly, the
apparatus of the state used for punishment (even if only fines) is operating
even if it is a private party to whom the power to energize it has been
delegated. If anything, as Redish and Mathews point out, we would want
greater, not lesser scrutiny if it is really the power of the state being brought
to bear under the name of punishment. What we need is an account that does
not try to explain the civil aspect of punitive damages by implausibly
squeezing it into the compensation mold, but that also does not concede that
we have full-fledged punishment, albeit by a different mechanism or for a
subset of punishable offenses.
I shall offer such a model of punitive damages in what follows. The
account derives from a philosophical theory of the structure of tort law that I
have previously labeled "the model of rights, wrongs, and recourse." Let me
say by way of preface that the point of this model is to provide a cogent
interpretation of the concepts and principles that constitute the common law
of torts. While these concepts and principles plainly have a normative
dimension, and while it is a large part of my project to illuminate this
normative dimension in a manner that renders it plausible, my aim is to
defend this as an interpretation, not to say that it is normatively correct.
V. The Model of Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse
It is central to the model of rights, wrongs, and recourse that tort law is
both more public and more private than most tort theorists recognize. 228 It is
more public in the following respect: tort law is built from public legal norms
that not only play a role in imposing liability, but also articulate norms of
conduct that enjoin individuals to treat each other in certain ways (e.g., with
reasonable care) and enjoin individuals from treating each other in certain
ways (e.g., not battering others, not defaming others, not defrauding others).
While these norms of conduct have normative content in the sense that they
impose duties of conduct and simultaneously protect rights to be treated in
certain ways, it is vitally important that their status as part of tort law is legal,
not moral. Part of the lawyer's job in advising her clients is to say what their
legal duties of conduct are, and this applies in torts as elsewhere. The breach
of these legal duties to others-defamation, fraud, battery, trespass,
negligence-are legal wrongs to others-literally, torts. A very large aspect
of tort law is the announcement and elaboration of such norms of conduct
228. Zipursky, Rights, supra note 5, at 63-69 (explaining how the primary rights and duties tort
law imposes have broad public and private rationales).
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and the concomitant classification of certain actions as legal wrongs. In the
sense that it is constituted in part by legal rules about how to treat others, not
just by attribution of costs to private parties, tort law is very much a matter of
public law.229
And yet scholars have also not fully grasped the respects in which tort
law is private law. Corrective justice theorists are ironically as guilty of this
as economists, I believe. They claim that a key concept in tort law is the
defendant's duty of repair to the plaintiff.230 But they have not really probed
deeply enough into the structure of torts. For when we probe deeply, we see
that the plaintiffs right of action against the defendant is a more basic
structural notion than the notion of a duty to repair. As Palsgraf famously
held, a plaintiff has a right of action in tort only against one who wronged
her.231 The point is not so much that one who has wronged another now
owes it to her to make her whole. If our system were really based on that
idea, it would make sense for the state to enjoy the power to bring a tort
action against a defendant, requiring defendant to pay plaintiff. That would
be, in an important sense, a much more public system than we in fact have.
What we in fact have is a system in which the power to bring a tort action
belongs to the one who has been wronged. It is literally a legal power to
force defendant to pay plaintiff, a legal power to take from the defendant.
This legal power is a right of action.232
I have argued in several prior articles that there is a principle underlying
the right to take from one who has injured another.233 It is not a principle that
the defendant owes the plaintiff; it is a principle that the plaintiff is entitled to
take from defendant. Similarly, the right to self-defense does not stem from
the fact that the assailant should be killed, but simply from the fact that the
normal prohibition of physical violence against someone does not apply
when one is engaging in self-defense. The victim of a tort has a right not in
the sense that defendant must pay, simpliciter, but in the sense that if the
victim chooses to bring a right of action, and proves the tort, she is not
prohibited from taking, but is in fact empowered to do so.
229. Id. at 92-93 (explaining that tort law creates "schemes of legal rights and duties" that
guide the behavior of individuals and are characteristic of public law); see also Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, supra note 5, at 755 (emphasizing that to the extent that tort law sets out public norms of
conduct, it is a matter of public law).
230. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 5, at 709-10 (describing the corrective justice
theory that tortfeasors are responsible-they owe a duty of repair-to injured parties for the harm
they cause).
231. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
232. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 5, at 733-38 (arguing that the rule of law in our
society prevents individuals from acting directly against individuals who have wronged them, but
empowers a plaintiff to bring a legal action against a defendant).
233. Id. at 735-38 (asserting that a plaintiff has the privilege to act through the state against one
who has legally wronged him or her); Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 5, at 643-44 (arguing that
one who has been wronged by another is entitled to recourse against that other because the state has
limited his right to respond immediately to the wrongdoing).
[Vol. 84:105
A Theory of Punitive Damages
What is the rationale for empowering the victim of a tort with a right of
action? The answer I offer is that our system recognizes in one who has been
wronged an entitlement to an avenue of civil recourse against the wrongdoer.
Our political system forbids violent actions against others, even in response
to a wrongdoing by them. But in forbidding this course of action, the state
assumes a duty to provide some avenue through which the aggrieved party
may at least respond to the wrong. The right of action is what the state
affords the citizen after his raw liberty to take is diminished. This avenue of
recourse is civil in three respects: it is civil, rather than criminal; it is civil in
the sense that it is artificially mediated through a system of government; and
it is civil, rather than violent. The idea of civil recourse is an idea of an
entitlement to civil recourse, for whomever has been wronged, against the
wrongdoer, in light of the wronged party's inability to respond to the wrong-
doing otherwise. I have elsewhere supplied a more thorough analysis of this
principle within a social contract-based normative framework.23 4
VI. Punitive Damages and Civil Recourse
A. The Right to Be Punitive
The idea of civil recourse supplies a nuanced view of the role of
damages, and of the ideal of "making whole." Under corrective justice
theory, making whole is the telos of the system, that for which the system
aims. But under civil recourse theory, the tort system is not trying to reach
some substantive ideal. It permits an individual whom it judges to have been
wronged to recover in tort from the one who wronged her. The notion of
making whole is not a goal but a constraint, normally, on the extent to which
plaintiff may redress her wrong. One may not take from the tortfeasor more
than one needs to make oneself whole. Yet one is entitled to take that
much.235
Punitive damages are best understood as an exception to this normal
rule. For certain torts, making whole is not the limit. A plaintiff is entitled to
go beyond making whole; she is entitled to be punitive. This permission
exists because of the manner in which she was wronged-willfully or
maliciously. Having suffered this insult, the plaintiff is herself entitled to
redress at a different level. Harking back to the self-defense analogy, the
idea of taking punitive damages is a privilege of the plaintiff; it is not a
234. The three principal articles in which I develop this idea are: Zipursky, Civil Recourse,
supra note 5, at 733-53 (developing an idea of entitlement to civil recourse based on a "rights,
wrongs, and recourse" model as a superior alternative to corrective justice theory); Zipursky,
Private Law, supra note 5, at 643-44 (developing an idea of entitlement to civil recourse as an
outgrowth of social contract theory); Zipursky, Rights, supra note 5, at 82-93 (developing an idea
of entitlement to civil recourse as a principle explaining tort law and its substantive standing rule).
235. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 5, at 738-40 (arguing that tort law properly
understood concerns "rights of action" rather than "duties to repair").
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punishment by the state. The state permits the plaintiff to seek and to receive
these awards, but the state is not in the driver's seat.
Let me note that the account thus far meshes well with the history and
the doctrinal structure of punitive damages at the common law.236 Punitive
damages are limited to cases of willful, malicious, or oppressive
wrongdoing.237 The normal limit under the common law is compensatory,
but it is in fact relaxed for punitive damages. The damages are not
necessary; they are discretionary, even where the jury decides that the
limiting criteria have been met. It is, in effect, a choice. And though the jury
has been told, historically, that the purpose of the award is to punish and to
set an example, even these instructions, couched in the procedural system I
have described, and set against a backdrop of lawyering that selected only
relatively few cases for punitive damages awards,238 make it plausible that
these awards were principally understood in terms of a plaintiff's power to be
punitive.
Punitive damages, when viewed in this light, are not solely regulatory,
criminal, compensatory-they may serve all of these functions. And, indeed,
they may serve a vindicative function of the sort indicated by Sebok.239
Courts are aware, at some level, that these functions are being served. But
articulating the functions of punitive damages, at least in this context, is not
necessarily equivalent to analyzing what punitive damages are.240  In the
context of saying why punitive damages are permitted as part of tort law,
notwithstanding significant constitutional qualms about penalties, fines, and
punishments, it is simply inadequate to rely on the functions served by puni-
tive damages. We need to know what sort of reason our system uses to
justify its demands upon defendants that they pay plaintiffs more than the
plaintiffs need in order to compensate for the actual harm, even though our
normal rule is that the system will limit its demands to compensation. If it is
deemed a sufficient reason that, in light of how bad the defendant's conduct
236. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 203, at 12-20 (tracing the development of the concept of
punitive damages out of a sequence of English cases in which defendants sought to have large
damages awards set aside, and the court rejected these appeals notwithstanding that the damages
exceeded tangible loss; part of the courts' reasons were connected to the jury's power to punish the
defendant).
237. Id. at20-21.
238. See id. at 2 (discussing the relatively low occurrence of cases involving punitive damages
in the past); Sebok, supra note 173, at 163 n.3 (noting that most courts usually only offer
"punishment" or "deterrence" as rationales for punitive damages).
239. See Sebok, supra note 173, at 200-01 (describing the personal vindication rationale behind
punitive damages).
240. See Zipursky, supra note 8 (expounding, in philosophical theory, the meaning and
significance of non-functionalist explanations of tort concepts); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra
note 5, at 724-32 (criticizing the corrective justice theory and its functionalist hybrid as ill-equipped
to adequately embody tort theory). But see COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 384 (asserting that tort law
is in part "a web of substantive and structural rules designed to enforce claims in corrective
justice"); WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 134 (arguing that the purpose of tort liability reflects the theory
of corrective justice).
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was, he ought to suffer these consequences, so that others may see, and so
that he gets what he deserves, and if our system's imposition of the demand
relies upon this justification, then the criminal aspect of punitive damages is
showing.
On the other hand, there is a different sort of reason our system may be
using to justify its demand upon the defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount
greater than compensatory damages. Our system may be deciding that the
plaintiff is entitled to exact this amount from the defendant, in light of what
the defendant did to her; that it is just that plaintiff shall be permitted to exact
this amount, notwithstanding that it exceeds compensatory damages. As the
United States Supreme Court said on one of the earliest of the occasions on
which it addressed punitive damages:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of
trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what
are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a
defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the
measure of compensation to the plaintiff.
241
More particularly, a jury may be deciding what is appropriate for the
plaintiff, in light of the "enormity of the offence," and a judge may be
entering a judgment for that amount because that is what the jury decided.
Our law is designed so that a jury is not permitted to grant such an award
without deciding that the conduct was willful or wanton, and a court is not
permitted to enter a judgment on a verdict including such damages without
deciding that the jury could reasonably reach such a conclusion. If that is
what the court is doing, then the entering of a judgment that includes a
punitive damages award is of course a use of state power, but it is
importantly different from an exercise of the state power to punish.242 And it
is not an example of the state authorizing an individual to carry out the state
role of punishing. It is the state's permission and empowerment of a plaintiff
to be vindictive, and to be punitive, albeit in a well-circumscribed and civil
way. This is the civil aspect of punitive damages.
B. Subjective Punitiveness and Objective Punitiveness
Although I hesitate to employ the easily misunderstood language of
objectivity and subjectivity, it may be helpful here. My central question has
been premised on the idea that punitive damages have two aspects, one of
which is penal, criminal, and public, the other of which is, in substance, civil
and private. The question-the double aspect problem-is how to interpret
and clarify these aspects in a manner that would shed light on the proper
analysis of the constitutional status of punitive damages. The answer can be
241. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
242. Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 5, at 649-51 (explaining the significance of the
distinction between state exercise of executive power and state exercise of judicial power,
permitting and empowering private plaintiffs).
2005]
Texas Law Review
expressed as follows: the punitiveness of punitive damages has a double
aspect, an objective aspect and a subjective aspect.
Objective punitiveness is the punitiveness we are intuitively
comfortable with in today's Anglo-American law. It is what conventional
tort scholars are referring to when they describe deterrence and punishment
as the functions of punitive damages. Punitive damages, in this respect, are
focused on the defendant's conduct and character. The question is whether
this conduct and character warrant or call for a certain response from the
legal system. The plaintiff, of course, is the one who calls the bad conduct to
the attention of the legal system, but ultimately it is the state that imposes the
award and the jury who decides what it should be. The question of where the
damage award goes is conceptually independent of the question of whether
the defendant ought to be required to pay it. This sense of punitiveness is
"objective" in the following respects: (1) attributes of the object of the
punishment-the defendant and its conduct-warrant or call for the
punishment; (2) the resemblance of the award to expressly criminal punish-
ment qualifies it as "punitive" (rather than compensatory); (3) the
justification for the existence of such an award relates to reasons or
principles or policies endorsed and imposed by the state, albeit in a civil
action.
The idea of subjective punitiveness makes some contemporary thinkers
squirm. It is the idea that the victim of a wrong is allowed to be punitive.
The imposition of punitive damages reflects a judgment that a private person
is entitled, in light of the wrong done to him or her, to act upon the defendant
in a manner that exceeds what is necessary to restore her holdings-to be
compensated for the injury done. She is entitled to exact a punitive sanction
from the defendant in light of what he did to her and how he did it. It is dis-
tinguished from objective punitive damages in the following respects: (1) it is
not the character of the conduct of the object of the punishment itself that
warrants the appropriate degree of permissible punishment, but the nature of
wrong the defendant required the victim (the subject of the punishment-the
punisher) to endure; (2) what qualifies the damages as "punitive" is that they
reflect and embody a subjective desire and intention to be punitive-to exact
a penalty for the purpose of being the one who requires the defendant to
endure a hardship; their punitiveness derives from their role, as intended by
our system, to permit a form of civil punitiveness by and in the victim; (3)
the justification for the permission of the damages is not the appropriateness
or the advisability of the state's imposing a sanction of this magnitude, but
rather the appropriateness of permitting and empowering private victims to
exact a penalty, beyond self-restoration, in a civil form.
The subjective punitiveness of punitive damages is in some ways
difficult to accept (and, indeed, there may be good reasons to reject it).
There is a quality of vengefulness to punitive damages in its civil aspect, so
understood. More precisely, the state, on this account, is choosing to
privilege and empower individuals to act in a manner that displays
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vengefulness. Undoubtedly this image of punitive damages as related to
private vengefulness is high on the list of reasons that many foreign
jurisdictions, as well as several American states, have decided to eradicate
punitive damages from their tort law.243 And even more to the point, it is
undoubtedly part of the reason why most jurisdictions are more comfortable
giving the objective punitiveness a more substantial, articulated role. For
many contemporary thinkers, vengefulness is a primitive instinct one should
try to get over, not the basis for a moral claim that our expensive legal
system will turn into a legal right. 2"
I shall have a bit more to say below about whether punitive damages
ought to be re-established on a more attractive basis or whether they should
be eliminated. Neither of these is the question at hand. The question at hand
is how to understand the dual structure of punitive damages; the suggestion
that vengefulness is morally unappealing is not directly relevant to this. Of
course, if there were something fundamentally incoherent about the idea of a
right to be punitive, then even from the positivistic point of view of
describing the content of the law, it would be problematic to give the idea of
a right to be punitive a prominent place. But even assuming there is merit in
the contemporary visceral aversion to punitive damages, that is far from an
argument that the cluster of normative ideas underlying the civil aspect of
punitive damages, as I have described it, is incoherent. I am not alluding to
lex talionis, an eye for an eye; I am countenancing a considerably weaker,
more civil idea. I am asserting that our law of punitive damages involves
permitting private parties, when a jury so decides, to exact monetary dam-
ages that go beyond compensatory damages in redressing a willful or
malicious wrong done to them.
C. Subjective and Objective Punitiveness and the Double Aspect Problem
The double aspect of punitive damages, its civil-criminal duality, is
captured in part by the subjective and objective senses of punitiveness.
Insofar as punitive damages are permitted because of a judgment that the
plaintiff is entitled to be punitive, the civil aspect is at play. Insofar as they
are deemed appropriate because the state is judging the defendant to be
meriting punishment (for reasons of deterrence or retribution), the criminal
aspect is at play. The double aspect problem then turns into a problem of
explaining when and why it matters whether the state is utilizing a remedy
rooted in subjective punitiveness, objective punitiveness, or both.
243. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381, 1062 n. 1 (2000) ("Several states reject...
punitive damages altogether .... ).
244. But see JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY, GETTING EvEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 17-26 (2003)
(arguing, within moral philosophy, that "retributive" responses to wrongdoing are in some cases
morally appropriate). Unlike Murphy, it is not my aim here to "defend" vengeance or retributive
responses; like Murphy, it is my aim to recognize and learn from the complexity of such responses,
and the extent to which they are integrated into our moral thinking and our legal institutions.
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When the punitive damages are justified only as objective punishment,
then it is untenable to deny that the state is imposing punishment, and the
criminal protections available should, at least prima facie, be applicable.
However, if the damages award represents something else-if it is really
something distinct from the imposition of punishment by the state, if it is
essentially civil-then it is not appropriate to plug in criminal procedural
safeguards. The problem is explaining what that "something else" could be.
The subjective aspect of punishment provides an explanation. For if a
punitive damages award is grounded in the state's judgment that the plaintiff
is entitled to be punitive in exacting a remedy from the defendant, then the
award is being granted within the context of the state's empowering action
among private parties, as a matter of the plaintiffs right of redress. The state
might be happy about the consequences of such an award, and might even
maintain its regime in part because of these recognized consequences. But if
the state is imposing punitive damages out of respect for a right of private
redress, then the reasons for providing criminal procedural protections are
not necessarily implicated.
Thus, my contention is that when a judgment for punitive damages is
entered such that the state could no longer be viewed as treating, in any
sense, the plaintiffs right to be punitive-when the punitiveness in the sub-
jective aspect is absent as a possible justification-the award may only be
understood in its objective aspect. In that case, the punitive damages award
must be understood as a state-imposed penalty. Constitutional restraints that
are applicable to state-imposed penalties, but not to genuine private liability
should, as a matter of constitutional principle, apply.
Although not derived from the theories entertained in connection with
the double aspect problem, the account developed above can be understood
as a means of simultaneously resolving the tensions correctly recognized by
each.245 The compensatory theories correctly recognized that constitutional
constraints akin to those required for punishment are not properly required
insofar as punitive damages are not grounded in a right to punish but to do
something else, the classic example in tort being compensation. However, it
is widely recognized that punitive damages present a prima facie problem
because they exceed individual compensation as normally construed. I have
argued that efforts to fix the problem by stretching the concept of
compensation in one direction or another did not succeed.246 On the other
hand, to conclude that punitive damages are indeed nothing but criminal
punishment is essentially to miss that they have, at least historically, been
245. Indeed, permitting the flexibility to address punitive damages in general, the double aspect
problem more specifically, and Gore in particular have long been some of the considerations
motivating the development of my civil recourse view. See Zipursky, Rights, supra note 5, at 95 &
n. 13 (referring to contemporary problems in the analysis of punitive damages, and Gore, as a reason
to want a civil recourse theory).
246. See supra subpart IV(A).
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sincerely understood as a part of the civil law of torts. The recourse account
retains the point that if punitive damages are really only objective
punishment, then constitutional constraints are due, but it does not squeeze
everything into the compensation mold. Compensation is significant in
differentiating private tort liability from criminal punishment. But it is not
the only thing that could do so, and it is not essential to the idea of a private
remedy (as opposed to public punishment). What is essential is that the
state's imposition of liability be premised on the state's judgment that the
plaintiff herself is entitled to exact this from the defendant. The right of a
person wrongfully injured to be made whole is the normal limit of the
entitlement to exact payment from defendant, but it is not the fundamental
normative basis of a right of action, and it is not necessarily the limit. In
certain cases, our system has judged that the remedy need not be limited by
the right to be made whole. Our system calls the privilege to exact payment
in excess of compensatory damages a right to obtain punitive damages.
Insofar as this right is rooted in the idea that a plaintiff who has been the
victim of a particularly malicious, willful, or wanton wrong is not necessarily
limited to self-restoration, but is permitted to be punitive, it is cogent to speak
of a "right to be punitive." That is the classic, civil law idea of punitive
damages, and it is distinct from the idea of delivering the punishment that the
state believes the defendant ought to suffer in light of its conduct.
The privatizers--Colby and Galanter and Luban-were in two respects
closer than the compensators and in one respect farther. They were closer
because they recognized that punitive damages are essentially punitive and
have always been essentially punitive, and because they recognized that there
is something distinctively and importantly private about punitive damages.247
They were farther because, under their respective theories, punitive damages
remained a form of state criminal punishment notwithstanding important pri-
vate aspects; the private aspects did not provide any significant reasons for a
sufficiently meaningful constitutional or political theoretic difference in
terms of the standards applied.248 For Colby, it is the privateness of the
wrong that counts249 and for Galanter and Luban it is the privateness of the
punisher.250 But punishment for a private wrong, as Colby conceives private
wrongs, is still completely punishment, and punishment by private parties to
247. See Colby, supra note 167, at 619, 643 (endorsing the argument that punitives inflict
"punishment for the private legal wrong-the insult---done to the individual plaintiff'); Galanter &
Luban, supra note 168, at 1426 (emphasizing the value of punitive damage awards for enforcing
private individuals' rights).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 193-198, 219-221 (criticizing the theories of Colby,
as well as Galanter and Luban, for their failure to explain why the respect in which punitive
damages were private would account for the appropriateness of less scrutiny).
249. Colby, supra note 167, at 648 (stating that punitive damages were initially upheld against
due process and double jeopardy challenges because they only punished the private wrong and not
the public wrong).
250. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 168, at 1440-41 (arguing that punitive damages are the
most effective method of exerting control over private actors).
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whom the state has delegated power is still completely punishing. None of
the reasons for constitutional scrutiny should vanish or even significantly
diminish.
The recourse view keeps the two strengths of the privatizers and
corrects their problem. Unlike Colby's view, the recourse view does not
make punitive damages a punishment in the same sense as criminal
punishment, only attached to a more narrowly defined act (a "private
wrong"). Nor is it, like Galanter and Luban's, a matter of the individuals
being private attorneys general to enforce the punishments required under the
law. Rather, the punitiveness is a matter of the right to be punitive, not a
matter of the plaintiff meting out punishment the state would wish to impose
because the defendant deserves or merits it. On the other hand, punitiveness
in this sense is distinct from punishment as a remedy imposed by the state
upon those who have transgressed legal boundaries of wrongful conduct in
such a way as to merit the official infliction of a sanction. Punitive damages
can play either or both roles, and this is why they have a double aspect.
It is instructive to look at the history of punitive damages in light of this
depiction of their double aspect. If one begins with private rights of action
brought against willful or malicious tortfeasors, English law originally
empowered and privileged individuals to impose violent physical
punishments upon those who had wronged them.251 The law eventually
channeled the power to inflict physical punishments to the state as prosecutor
and conditioned it in various ways that we now regard as precursors to
constitutional criminal procedure.252 The right to seek damages and certain
more limited injunctive remedies was all that was left for private parties. 253
Within damages, rules developed according to which the measure of
damages was: (a) left to the jury, but (b) typically limited to costs for the
actual damage inflicted. However, in cases where the actual damages
inflicted were small but the wrong was willful or malicious, juries sometimes
awarded large damages verdicts.254 On appeal, defendants argued that the
damages were excessive, and the courts responded that in cases of willful
wrong, punitive damages, vindictive damages, or exemplary damages were
permitted.255 Plaintiff was empowered by this process to make an example of
251. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law,
76 B.U. L. REv. 59, 59-60 (1996) (stating that English law allowed victims to choose whether to
exact personal vengeance through criminal law or to be compensated through tort law).
252. Id. at 64 (discussing the expansion of the king's and state's authority in relation to
punishment).
253. Id. at 85 (describing the writ of trespass and attendant monetary remedies).
254. See Ellis, supra note 203, at 12-13 (recounting a case in which a 17th-century English jury
awarded a plaintiff £4,000 in damages for slander).
255. Id. (tracing conflicting trends by English courts in both overturning and upholding
extremely large damage awards).
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defendant by exacting a large damages award.256 For the most part, these
were classic intentional torts with a substantial component of insult or
dignitary slight.257 The courts envisioned the damages award as something
that it was only fair to permit the plaintiff to exact in light of the defendant's
conduct.258 And the courts openly reasoned that this kind of award would
probably serve as a punishment.259 Thus, even from the first cases, both
senses of punishment were at play.
Now, there need not be any incompatibility between these two senses.
Indeed, even as to compensatory damages, there is nothing necessarily in-
consistent about the view that plaintiff is entitled to be made whole, and the
view that providing compensatory damages in tort tends to deter risky
conduct by making potential tortfeasors aware in advance that they will have
to pay for the damages their unduly risky conduct causes.
D. Punitive Damages in Tort Law Today
Punitive damages doctrine in American tort law today is plainly not
simply about the plaintiffs right to be punitive. And punitive damages are
not simply about the plaintiff as a private attorney general, helping the state
to append a criminal or regulatory punishment to a private compensatory
award. Today's punitive damages in tort law are about both at once.
Perhaps this has been true for a long time; establishing that, however, would
require a historical study of a form I have not undertaken. It is clear in 2005,
and has certainly been so for the past few decades, that punitive damages are
a hybrid of these two ideas.
How might this theoretical apparatus help us to understand punitive
damages better? As indicated above, it is not novel to assert that punitive
damages have this hybrid status. Indeed, I have pointed to a variety of
features of tort law that, in effect, recognize the hybrid status-the utilization
of a clear and convincing evidence standard, the need for a heightened state
of mind requirement, problems about insurability and indemnification, and
the existence of split-recovery statutes. These are all good examples of the
mixed status of current law. And so one might wonder how a civil recourse
theory of tort law, even assuming it is accurate, really makes progress in tort
theory or in practical tort debates.
256. See, e.g., Gilreath v. Allen, 32 N.C. 67 (10 Ired.) (1849) (depicting the role of exemplary
or vindictive damages in making an example of defendant).
257. See Sebok, supra note 173, at 185 (reasoning that punitive damages compensate the victim
for his wounded honor),
258. See, e.g., Allen, 32 N.C. 68 (10 [red.) ("[W]hen there are circumstances of aggravation,
juries are not restricted, in the measure of damages, to a mere compensation for the injury, actually
sustained, but may, in their discretion, increase the amount, according to the degree of
malice ....").
259. See Sebok, supra note 173, at 202 (observing that the court awarded punitive damages as a
punishment in order to make an example of the defendant for other likeminded criminals).
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Even leaving aside constitutional issues (see below), three sorts of
advantages immediately spring to mind. First, to concede that punitive
damages have hybrid status is quite different from understanding that status.
Indeed, the concession to hybrid status can mean, and usually has meant,
simply the negative point that neither the civil nor the criminal picture fits
well-the former because the damages were not compensatory, and the latter
because the state was not bringing the litigation, and the misconduct was not
defined as a crime. The explanation offered here explains the civil aspect in
a manner that is not merely negative, formal, or conclusory. The civil aspect
is not simply that we permit private parties to bring the action; we also
permit a wrongdoing not defined as a crime, and we permit the plaintiff to
keep all (or some) of what the "punished" defendant is required to pay.
Punitive damages are displayed as something our system offers as part of a
private law picture of entitlement to a private remedy, in light of what the
defendant did. Punitive damages are displayed as criminal, insofar as the
reason for awarding them sounds in deterrence and retribution.
Second, and relatedly, the procedural features of the system can be
understood in relation to the system's embodiment of these genuinely civil or
criminal features. It is not simply that judges perceive the award as
somewhat civil and somewhat criminal, and therefore select a mix of
procedural features, like Goldilocks selecting Baby Bear's porridge because
it is not too hot and not too cold. If punitive damages are indeed warranted
as part of a civil remedy for a plaintiff, then even if part of the purpose in
awarding them may be to deter, the plaintiff-and not the state-ought to be
able to keep the damages. Conversely, if the jury is not opining on what
plaintiff is entitled to exact, but simply on what the defendant should be
sanctioned in light of deterrence and retribution, then there is no particular
reason plaintiff should be able to keep the award. Similarly, various sorts of
jury instructions will make sense if the state is conceiving of the award one
way rather than another, and various sorts of procedural protections will fit
on the civil model and not on the criminal. This is not to say that a legal
system could never choose an intermediate option-as, for example, clear
and convincing evidence-but that it should do so with a clear understanding
of what the system is, not because it is too puzzled or tired to think through
which box to choose.
Third, from a practical point of view, a more fulsome understanding of
the structure and significance of punitive damages in our tort system should
enable us to make better decisions on what to do with them. What should the
evidentiary standard be? Should they be insurable? How, if at all, should the
defendant's wealth figure into punitive damages? How, if at all, should
punitive damages relate to compensatory damages? How, if at all, should
other conduct by the defendant figure into punitive damages? Should it be
possible to have punitive-damages-only litigation? Do caps on punitive
damages make sense? Are punitive damages a sensible way to deter
corporate misconduct? What sorts of arguments should a plaintiff be able to
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use in front of a jury regarding punitive damages? All of these practical
questions will of course be sensitive to a variety of political, judicial, and
economic considerations. But the starting point is understanding how
punitive damages fit into our tort law.
VII. Gore Revisited
With this in mind, let us turn back to Gore itself. The $4 million verdict
of the jury was so plainly untenable as an account of the extent to which
Gore himself was entitled to be punitive, in light of the wrong done to him,
that there is no way around Gore's simply being a case of indirectly
commenced state punishment. As such, the "immunity" that belongs to
punitive damages as part of civil liability between private parties drops out of
the picture. The award, if considered as a fine for what BMW was proven to
have done to Gore, was dazzlingly excessive; moreover, the notice of such an
award and the standards for it were plainly unacceptable as a matter of
procedural due process.26° If Alabama wants to do this as a regulatory
penalty, it must put some regulations with some standards for conduct and
some standards for penalties on the books. Scalia's complaints about sub-
stantive due process are off the mark because this is not substantive, but
procedural due process. 261 His Haslip argument is off the mark because the
law has simply metamorphosed into a penalty masquerading as civil liability,
for all of the reasons mentioned.262  Ginsburg's complaints about judicial
restraint and institutional competence (which also animated Scalia's
260. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 46 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Alabama,
making no pretensions whatsoever, gives civil juries complete, unfettered, and unchanneled
discretion to determine whether or not to impose punitive damages. Not only that, the State tells the
jury that it has complete discretion. This is a textbook example of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine."). The point of citing O'Connor's dissent here is quite particular: the argument is that
once the reasons for bracketing the civil aspect have disappeared, O'Connor's arguments are
extremely powerful. To put it differently, I do not wish to beg the question of the adequacy of her
arguments, but to explain them by using the subjective-objective framework to capture the respects
in which her view was inadequate.
261. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598-99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do
not regard the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a secret repository of substantive
guarantees against 'unfairness'-neither the unfairness of an excessive civil compensatory award,
nor the unfairness of an 'unreasonable' punitive award. What the Fourteenth Amendment's
procedural guarantee assures is an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment
in state court; but there is no federal guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable.").
262. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] state trial procedure that commits the decision
whether to impose punitive damages, and the amount, to the discretion of the jury, subject to some
judicial review for 'reasonableness,' furnishes a defendant with all the process that is 'due."'). See
also supra notes 191-199 and accompanying text (citing Colby as identifying the constitutional
treatment of punitive damages as justified only by a "historical pedigree."). As I noted above in
criticizing Colby, Scalia and Thomas might reject this response to the historical distinction. So be
it. As I also indicated, the majority of the Court-indeed all members but Scalia and Thomas-
either (a) take relevant changes over history to be relevant to force of the history, or (b) do not take
history to be dispositive in any case, or adopt both (a) and (b). Most relevantly, the account of the
civil aspect offered here articulates a normative (not just positive) basis for the relative immunity of
private civil damages awards, which Colby did not do for private punishment.
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discussion) are sound only if one takes as one's foil the view that this is not a
real due process problem, but simply a problem of part of the law getting out
of hand.263 That is no longer the best foil.
The foregoing explanation succeeds in identifying why the Court was
not willing to let the award in Gore stand. There was no blinking the fact
that it was a state punishment, and the civil model upon which the Court had
relied as a reason for staying its hand in Browning-Ferris and Haslip just
could not hold up. It also tells us a bit about chestnuts-about great cases-
for it is quite plausible that the sheer power of the facts in Gore pushed the
majority over the edge. And it is surely part of why we focus upon great
cases: We can perceive more clearly troubling features of legal frameworks
when a particular set of facts vividly displays those features. In Gore, we are
led to focus on how absurd it is to suppose that Dr. Gore is entitled to redress
the fraud perpetrated upon him by exacting a $2 million penalty from BMW.
What is vivid is Dr. Gore's lack of entitlement to these damages as a form of
private redress, the completely anomalous character of a $2 million remedy
for the concealment of initial (but now virtually undetectable) paint damage
on the surface of one man's luxury car. And what is equally vivid-but not
particularly anomalous-is the idea that a jury has made a judgment based on
what it thinks is an appropriate punishment the legal system should inflict
upon BMW. The objective aspect of punitive damages is virtually the only
aspect that shows in Gore and so the Court ends up treating it, in effect, as a
case of criminal punishment.
Gore was, therefore, on its facts the perfect case for making the
argument that punitive damages should be subject to constitutional
constraint. But having just the right facts nevertheless left a very serious
problem. As we have already noted at length, the Court's prior decisions had
seemed to shut off the most tenable routes for constitutional analysis, leaving
only an amorphous due process constraint perilously close to delegitimated
Lochner precedents.264 Of course, it was highly relevant that the Court itself
had expressed the intention to use that amorphous due process constraint.265
Of additional importance, perhaps, was the fact that Gore presented the
opportunity for an interesting and quite compelling state sovereignty and
comity argument in federalist terms.266 In any event, we now have a better
sense of why Gore is a "chestnut" in at least one respect: the facts of the case
itself are such a powerful illustration of one, and just one, aspect of punitive
damages, that the resistance presented by that other aspect simply vanished.
263. Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court, I am convinced,
unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the state's domain ... .
264. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.
265. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454-55, 458
(1993) (citing several Lochner-era "due process" cases with approval and announcing a standard of
"grossly excessive"). Indeed, TXO purports to use that constraint to evaluate the damages award,
but does not strike down the award.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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If this account is right, then-at least starting from a blank slate on
punitive damages, and at least in theory-Gore would have provided a good
opportunity to declare that protection under the Excessive Fines Clause, the
Due Process Clause, or both should be offered under a theory that
emphasizes the vagueness of the conduct guidelines, the vagueness of the
penalty guidelines, the absence of criminal procedural safeguards and, in
addition, the absence of safeguards that would be reasonable on a Mathews v.
Eldridge analysis. At least two powerful sets of reasons counted against
doing so in Gore. First, all of these arguments had been expressly rejected in
prior cases.267 Second, a large part of the motivation for rejecting them in
prior cases was not simply the tort-theoretic reason I have cited-the
presence of a civil component, what I have called the "subjectively" punitive
aspect of punitive damages. A large part of it was a set of meta-reasons
sounding in federalism and more particularly in judicial restraint when it
comes to interfering with the common law of torts under state law. 268  So
quite apart from the fact that the Court had not in fact conceived a way to
understand the double aspect of punitive damages and had not crafted a
plausible way to pry apart, conceptually, the sort of punitiveness that in
principle calls for heightened scrutiny from that which does not-and even
assuming that the theory presented here is sound-the Court was moved by
meta-considerations that cast doubt on its ability to winnow out the suspect
from the nonsuspect. Put differently, there are strong reasons of restraint
why the Court might be wise to refrain from declaring a substantial and
politically contentious aspect of state tort law structurally unconstitutional.
Interestingly, the meta-reasons led the Court, in TXO and Haslip, to a
tentative in-principle position: punitive damages could become
unconstitutional, but we are going to hesitate as long as we can before saying
that any particular award actually does.26 9
267. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20)
(explaining that although vague legal standards risk arbitrary results and invite judicial scrutiny, the
vagueness does not in itself violate due process); TXO, 509 U.S. at 462-63 (finding meritless the
assertion that a punitive damages award violated due process because the state courts did not
adequately review the award and because there was no advance notice that a jury could return such
a large damages award); id. at 474-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that in the area of punitive
damages, juries often receive "only vague and amorphous guidance" and that the Court has not held
such instructions unconstitutional); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24 n.12 (citing Giaccio, 382 U.S. 399)
(rejecting Pacific Mutual's void-for-vagueness argument that attempted to rely on Giaccio as
support for its argument that focused on the jury's discretion in fixing the amount of punitive
damages); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause "places no limits on the amount of
punitive damages that can be awarded in a suit between private parties").
268. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74.
269. TXO, 509 U.S. at 454-58 (refusing to recognize a bright-line rule which could be applied
to every case but recognizing that a grossly excessive punitive award might violate the Due Process
Clause); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-18 (recognizing that punitive damages have long been a part of
state tort law, but that it would be inappropriate to say that, because they have been recognized for
so long, their imposition is never unconstitutional).
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Gore of course was the case in which they could hesitate no longer: the
substance broke through a rather powerfully felt set of reasons sounding in
restraint. The analysis above has suggested this was no accident; strikingly
absent in Gore is a plausible version of the subjective sort of punitiveness
that constitutes the core of the civil aspect of punitive damages, which in turn
underlies the Court's reasons for restraint. But the problem was that all the
enumerated provisions that would, in fact, have provided principled grounds
for constitutional concerns seemed to have been shut down. And so the
Court seems to have invented something new: on Scalia's account, a new
chapter of substantive due process without any basis in fundamental rights;
on the hindsight reconstruction, an Eighth Amendment excessive fines idea
attached to the Due Process Clause, but distinct from the Eighth Amendment.
Neither makes much sense as a source of authority, as argued above.
How might Gore have been decided if the double aspect problem had
been understood? Perhaps the Court might have done well to articulate a
synthesis along the following lines: 270 Where the state's enforcement of a
punitive damages award can be understood as reflecting an effort, by the
state, to permit the plaintiff to obtain redress to which she is entitled in light
of the wrong defendant did to her, constitutional constraints appropriate to
penalties, fines, and punishment are not appropriate. However, where the
award cannot be so understood, even from a perspective that adopts a wide
measure of deference to the states and restraint in judicial review, then not
only is the state imposing a penalty, but the state must be treated as imposing
a penalty or fine. As is generally true under the Eighth Amendment, the
legislative framework within which the fine is located and the compliance by
the state with that framework normally demand such a high level of
deference from a federal court that the Court declines to do a substantive
proportionality review under the Excessive Fines Clause. However,
individually driven punitive damages awards do not generally arrive within
the protective clothing that such a procedural background delivers.27 Thus,
for due process reasons, they are dissimilar from most criminal and
regulatory fines.272 Whether they are thereby procedurally defective is a
question that has not been addressed fully, but there are again reasons for
caution in interfering with state tort law. At a minimum, two sorts of reasons
for declining to engage in Eighth Amendment excessiveness review do not
apply: it is not genuinely something that implicates the state only because it
is providing redress (and therefore it is genuinely a fine); and it is not
insulated by a legislative process or even an executive process. Therefore,
270. The following should be read only as an articulation, from an academic's point of view, of
the type of theoretical treatment that would have met the various constraints that the Gore court
faced in light of its precedents and its general posture.
271. See Karlan, supra note 135, at 918-19 (contrasting the standards of review and procedural
constraints in criminal punishment and punitive damages contexts).
272. Id.
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substantive review of excessiveness should apply. Reprehensibility, actual
and potential harm, and comparable civil and criminal sanctions are rough
guideposts for determining excessiveness.
Because the Eighth Amendment excessiveness inquiry only applies to
certain awards in light of their lack of procedural insulation, it is fairly
considered a hybrid of due process and the Eighth Amendment. Because
Browning-Ferris did not contemplate a case which lacked a substantial
subjective punitiveness that could, under highly deferential review, render
the award permissible, Browning-Ferris7 3 is distinguishable.274
Therefore, nothing in the Court's prior case law, either on punitive
damages specifically or on the Excessive Fines Clause more generally,
foreclosed the recognition of an Eighth Amendment right, applied through
the Due Process Clause and couched in a theory that declines high deference
to state law because of reasons sounding in legislative process. Although
Browning-Ferris appears to have done so, neither the facts of Browning-
Ferris nor the theories put forward by the parties or entertained by the court
presented an excessive fines argument based on a version of a punitive
damages award that only pretended to be a matter of private right under an
individual civil right of action.
Not only are Haslip275 and TXO 276 consistent with this approach, they
themselves foreshadowed excessiveness review based on Due Process
concerns. Both cases display, in a concededly inchoate way, a certain sort of
ambivalence. On the one hand was inaction on punitive damages, based on
both considerations of deference rooted in federalism, and judicial caution
rooted in history and respect for state tort law.277 On the other hand was a
felt need to concede that the startling sorts of punitive damages that have
been coming down seem to differ from our historically entrenched punitive
damages; that history should not, in any case, be dispositive. Although there
is no desire to fiddle with state procedure, there does seem to be a problem
both of constitutional magnitude and of constitutional type, and some
combination of excessiveness, unreasonableness, and due process violation is
the best we can do to articulate why we believe it is of constitutional type.278
273. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
274. See infra notes 288-293 and accompanying text (describing the defendant's efforts to
crush the plaintiff "like a bug" as giving rise to a legitimate subjective right to be punitive).
275. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
276. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
277. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-20 (recognizing the state's interest in deterrence and
retribution); TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 (acknowledging the state's power to deter).
278. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 9-13 (summarizing earlier cases where the Court acknowledged that
juries can unpredictably award punitive damages in amounts bearing no relation to the harm caused,
but refused to address directly what limits the Due Process Clause places on undue jury discretion);
TXO, 509 U.S. at 457-58 (recognizing that jury awards differ greatly because they result from
numerous fact-based considerations, but refusing to define a bright-line test to assess the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards).
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Now equipped with a theoretical framework that can handle the double
aspect of punitive damages, we are positioned to see why there was a bit of
slippage in Justice Blackmun's Haslip opinion that evolved into a problem in
Gore. Justice Blackmun emphasized, based on a consistent acceptance of
punitive damages by state and federal courts, that the common law method
for assessing punitive damages is not "so inherently unfair as to deny due
process and be per se unconstitutional. 279 Shortly thereafter, he derided the
idea that history provides absolute insulation from constitutional scrutiny,
and inferred that the question left open is whether the "Due Process Clause
renders the punitive damages award in this case constitutionally
unacceptable., 280 Blackmun slipped easily from a rejection of the idea that
the common law method is inherently unfair to the idea that if there is a
violation of Due Process, it is a violation in this case. But that is too quick
an inference. It remains a possibility that the problem does not lie in the very
idea of punitive damages at the common law, but in a particular direction that
punitive damages in tort law has, as it turns out, developed. Then, while
punitive damages as assessed at the common law would not be per se
unconstitutional, punitive damages in the jurisdiction in question, for the type
of case and procedure used, could be unconstitutional. The foil to punitive
damages not being inherently unconstitutional is not simply their being
unconstitutional in a particular case, or at a particular number; they could be
unconstitutional given a particular direction of evolution in a particular
jurisdiction or jurisdictions.
The Court does not entertain this possibility seriously. As Colby,
Redish and Mathews, Sebok and Wright show, 281 there is much to be said
for a view that takes the constitutional problems associated with punitive
damages to be, in part, the product of substantial changes in both the letter of
punitive damages law and the surrounding practices in which it is used and
applied-not simply in the fact that today's numbers are arguably an order of
magnitude greater than those of earlier generations (even when adjusted for
inflation).282 Indeed, the inflation of the numbers is very likely a product, at
least in part, of changes in jury instructions, attorney instructions, judicial
overview, and in the kinds of cases where punitive damages claims are
brought and won. 283 For example, today's judges and trial lawyers tend to
279. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
281. See supra Part IV.
282. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 597-98 (1996) (appendix to concurring
opinion of Breyer, J.).
283. See John G. Corlew, The Pursuit of Deep Pockets: An Historical Overview of Punitive
Damages in Mississippi, 63 MIss. L.J. 583, 600-01 (1994) (emphasizing that punitive damages
awards skyrocketed once plaintiffs discovered a target in vulnerable insurance companies); Michael
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1305-07 (1993) (confirming that punitive damages
awards were once restricted to cases of malicious conduct, but are now commonly available when a
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push harder, and more concretely, on the social value of a strongly deterrent
message that is keyed to what would be an effective sort of liability rule in
terms of protecting the public from the unduly risky conduct that is
undertaken willfully.284 In particular, many trial lawyers deliberately adopt a
kind of argument that embraces the private attorney general model and
encourages jurors to select some kind of measure to calibrate their
punishment of defendants' corporate decisionmakers so that it will have a
powerful deterrent effect. 285  Black-letter law on evidence and jury
instructions that may be presented as to punitive damages has developed far
beyond where it was when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified (and, a
fortiori, when the Eighth Amendment was ratified). There is no reason to
believe that any historical decisions on the processes appropriate for punitive
damages, and their distinctiveness from fines, were broad enough, robust
enough, and close enough to what we are looking at today to assume that
those decisions were made in the past.
If this rational reconstruction of Gore were accepted, certain aspects of
constitutional punitive damages assessment would require elaboration, and
some would probably warrant change. First, and most closely related to the
subject of this article, in principle not all punitive damages awards should be
subject to Gore-like, excessive-fines-type scrutiny. Gore was a case with
facts more powerful than the Court's grasp. The importance of the facts was
their capacity to display, by example, why the sort of constitutional scrutiny
appropriate for punishment was sometimes undeniably appropriate for puni-
tive damages. Our theoretical account of why that was so was that there was
no way to understand the judgment entered in Gore as, in any form, an effort
by the state to empower the plaintiff to exact what he was entitled to from
BMW, in light of the wrong done to him. It was therefore unequivocally a
case about the imposition of a punishment deemed objectively appropriate to
the defendant's conduct-it was a case of punishment in the objective sense
only, and therefore in the criminal sense. This raises the question of whether
defendant engages in highly negligent acts); id. at 1332 (describing the use of punitive damages in
business and contract disputes as a recent development).
284. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (characterizing punitive damages as
"private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence"); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 223, at 161 (explaining that in cases where measuring
actual damages is difficult, courts are often justified in imposing punitive damage awards that
prevent underdeterrence and free courts from the heavy costs of calculating actual damages);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the
Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2005) (asserting that deterrence,
rather than private compensation, often serves as the Court's primary motivation in decisions under
securities and investor protection laws).
285. See Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court that Would be
King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 529 (2005) (indicating that when plaintiffs act as
private attorneys general, punitive damages serve to "vindicate the larger societal interest by
bridging the enforcement gap and increas[ing] both punishment and deterrence"); Stephenson,
supra note 284, at 103-04 (observing that, in seeking to improve enforcement of statutes, courts
often think of plaintiffs as private attorneys general, rather than as victims seeking compensation).
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constitutional scrutiny of punitive damages is appropriate in a case in which
the judgment could be understood as an effort by the state to empower the
plaintiff to exact a remedy to which the plaintiff was entitled. The
implication of the analysis is, at a minimum: when the punitive damages
award is properly regarded as reflecting a judgment about the plaintiffs
right to be punitive, constitutional scrutiny appropriate to criminal
punishments should not apply. This would involve not simply the analogue
of excessive fines review, but procedural Due Process protections, too.286
The latter could, at least in principle, be applied even where the actual
damages award is not large enough to raise a "judicial eyebrow." 28 7
What will determine whether an award is properly regarded as reflecting
a judgment about the plaintiffs right (or privilege) to be punitive? This is
related to the question of when an award of punitive damages is one that a
reasonable juror could have concluded the plaintiff was entitled to in light of
the wrong defendant did to her. In fact, whether an award reflects the right to
be punitive is a combination of this question, plus aspects of deference, the
content of the jury charge, and the kinds of evidence and arguments
presented to the jury. Put differently, if there is no good reason to believe
that the jury opined on this question or that if it had opined upon it, it could
have reached this result, then it would not properly be regarded as reflecting
such a judgment.
Let us look at Gore itself. There is no reason to believe that the jury
thought about this question: the jury instructions, the evidence presented, and
the arguments made to the jury looked almost entirely to a broader scope of
conduct by BMW. But if the jury had thought about it, could the jury have
reached this judgment? I have argued above that part of what made Gore
illuminating is that it is so intuitively clear that the jury could not have
reached this judgment. But why not? Part of the reason, it seems to me, is
that Gore did not really have a particularly serious grievance against BMW.
The right to be punitive exists, in part, out of recognition of a substantial
grievance against the defendant. The magnitude of the grievance determines,
to some extent, the magnitude of the right of redress. A right to exact
286. The gray area is what should happen in a case in which an award could, within reason, be
interpreted as permitting the plaintiff to exact a remedy to which he is entitled or, alternatively,
could be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that is not about the plaintiff's right at all, but about
the defendant objectively meriting punishment. How this sort of case ought to be dealt with is, in
part, a question of the level of oversight the court reviewing the constitutionality question thinks it
appropriate to apply to the jury verdict, and, more generally, the framework of state law-the lighter
the touch and the stronger the deference, the more appropriate to look at how the damages award
could be interpreted.
287. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993). Whether
the Court believes even fines that are not prima facie excessive should be subject to heightened
constitutional scrutiny is not just an issue of whether "excessiveness" is essential to there being a
constitutional problem; a plausible form of judicial restraint in this area of state tort law could
involve a systemic decision to decline to review (even on purely procedural grounds) awards that
are not prima facie "too big."
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damages of $2 million would comport with a much more significant willful
injuring of Gore than that which occurred. Indeed, in light of the relatively
minor fraudulent concealment, the grievance legitimately held against BMW
by Gore is quite paltry. Perhaps redress of $4,000-the difference in value,
as decided by the jury, between the price paid and the actual market value
with full disclosure--does not fully correlate to the grievance. But it is pre-
posterous that the grievance associated with this transaction was anywhere
near the size that a jury would have believed warranted personal redress of
$2 million.
The facts of Browning-Ferris present a fascinating contrast to those of
Gore. Joseph Kelley, the individual plaintiff in that case, had left the
defendant company, Browning-Ferris, to start his own small business, Kelco
(which is in fact the name plaintiff and the name petitioner in the caption of
the Supreme Court case). Kelco was a small competitor of Browning-Ferris
in the waste disposal industry.288 Browning-Ferris was a huge, billion dollar
business that decided to "crush" plaintiffs "like a bug," according to
testimony the jury heard.289 The campaign to crush the plaintiffs went on for
a matter of years, and involved powerful below-market price-setting in order
to bankrupt the plaintiffs. 290 During that period, the power of Browning-
Ferris's efforts to drive Kelco and Kelley out of business were enormous; as
Kelley's lawyer put it to the Supreme Court, "[h]owever it may appear to
petitioners [Browning-Ferris], it was hardly a trivial matter to Joseph Kelley
to find himself faced with destruction of a business into which he had put his
,,291 So9helife savings. So they filed suit in response, and won a jury trial.292 The
compensatory damages were only $51,146, but the plaintiff also
demonstrated the right to exact punitive damages, and the jury awarded
$6,000,000 in punitive damages.293 Here is a case where one can easily
imagine the jury believing defendant had an extraordinarily legitimate
grievance against defendant, a former employer who set out to crush him
financially. And one can imagine the jury thinking the right to exact
$6,000,000 in punitives was proportionate to the grievance.
The more general point is that one must look at the nature and
magnitude of the personal wrong inflicted upon the plaintiff (and presented
to the jury) before one is able to judge whether the punitive damages verdict
is plausibly understood as the jury's effort to calibrate the punitive remedy to
288. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 260-61.
291. Brief for Respondents at 39, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (No. 88-556). The jury in Browning-Ferris heard testimony
that Kelley and his wife put their life savings into their new start-up company and sold their house
and then borrowed further cash to keep the company going in the face of the pressures from
Browning-Ferris. Joint Appendix at 14, Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (No. 88-556).
292. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 261-62.
293. Id. at 262.
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the willful wrong endured by plaintiff. It is not so much that the law favors
an eye for an eye; it is that when analysts and scholars look to what juries
have decided a plaintiffs entitlement is, it is sensible to imagine that juries
are themselves operating within an eye-for-an-eye frame of mind. And so
long as an award represents the judgment of what the plaintiff's entitlement
is, then we do not need to reach the question of whether state punishment is
occurring.
VIII. Conclusion
Candor is the starting point of an adequate theory of punitive damages.
Being candid about punitive damages means admitting a number of
discomforting truths. First and foremost among these realities is the fact that
punitive damages are partly about permitting tort plaintiffs to be punitive, to
exact damages that go beyond what they need to be made whole, because
they desire to see the defendant endure an unpleasant consequence. As I
have put it, punitive damages give legal recognition to a right to be punitive.
Indulging vengeful and punitive instincts is not something in which most of
us take pride, and we are not particularly thrilled to see it in our legal system
either. I have argued above that we cannot make sense of the reality of puni-
tive damages as part of our tort law without giving substantial attention to
this, quite critically civil, aspect of punitive damages. But drawing on civil
recourse theory, I have tried to offer a less harsh and more balanced picture
of the role of punitive damages, even within a conception that takes
vengefulness seriously. I have argued that, taken within the broader context
of the structure and civility of private law, and the narrowness of punitive
damages as a remedy, the private punitiveness recognized by tort law is
neither primitive nor irrational. It can be understood as having a place, albeit
small, within a reasonable, social-contract-based system of private law.
A second "harsh reality" of punitive damages is that the "private law"
story is hardly the whole story. Since their inception, punitive damages have
sometimes been called "exemplary" damages. Courts have frequently
referred to the deterrence function of punitive damages.294 It is possible that
there was an earlier time when this "function" of punitive damages fit
smoothly and comfortably within the private punitiveness model; that would
take more investigation than I have done. But American punitive damages
law today-and for the past several decades-has included a robust
conception of punitive damages as a criminal or quasi-criminal idea that
envisions the imposition of damages as a deterrent and retributive sanction
imposed by the state, on the occasion of a plaintiffs private law suit.
295
294. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (stating
that one of the goals of assessing punitive damages is deterrence).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 147-161.
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In one sense, this is not such a "harsh" reality, for there is nothing
unseemly about state punishment of seriously wrongful conduct, and in
fact-as both economists and legal scholars have rightly indicated-such
punishment may serve important functions where there would otherwise be
serious gaps in deterrence. And yet the story does not stop here.
Fundamental constitutional values and rule-of-law values demand that there
be certain kinds of clarity and notice as to what sorts of conduct will be
punished; certain kinds of standards and notice for the selection of
punishment level; and certain kinds of limits to the punishments selected.
For decades, punitive damages law has passed under the constitutional radar
screen because it is nominally civil. To the extent that what it is really about
is virtually the same as criminal punishment, the "nominally civil" finesse is
unsatisfying and unjust: the worst kind of formalism. Gore and its progeny
represent the delicate project that arose when courts came to take seriously
this criminal aspect of punitive damages: the courts must craft a way to treat
punitive damages-insofar as they are a form of state punishment-in a
manner commensurate with our constitutional norms surrounding
punishment, and must strive to do so without indulging themselves in a
massive rewriting of the civil law of damages within the states.
Thus, the two aspects of punitive damages--civil and criminal-
correspond to the state's empowerment of private plaintiffs to be punitive,
and the state's own act of punishment. Prying apart these aspects
analytically should help us work toward a modest, workable, and defensible
constitutional doctrine for scrutiny of punitive damages. More
fundamentally, it should help us understand and work toward a sensible and
coherent doctrine of punitive damages within tort. How to formulate state-
of-mind requirements, jury instructions, insurance law, evidentiary standards,
damages caps, split-recovery statutes, punitive damage bifurcations,
standards for appellate review, and even the question of whether to have
punitive damages at all-these are persistent and difficult issues that today
give off more heat than light. An open explanation and recognition of the
punitiveness in punitive damages is an apt way to begin down that path.
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